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resumo 
 
 
Os mercados accionistas, enfrentando uma elevada concorrência, devem ser 
transparentes e justos. Consequentemente, o propósito desta dissertação é 
investigar o que determina a transparência e também, as suas consequências 
no mercado, nomeadamente, a volatilidade do preço das acções. 
Esta preocupação levou a uma análise das práticas de divulgação em 86 
empresas não financeiras da Euronext Lisboa e Bruxelas, considerando uma 
amostra comparativa de Portugal e Bélgica para o ano de 2008. A escolha foi 
feita considerando a dimensão dos respectivos mercados de capitais e o facto 
de ambos os países pertencerem à Euronext NV. 
Na primeira parte da dissertação, é analisada a relação entre transparência e 
um conjunto de variáveis, tais como a dimensão da empresa, endividamento, 
auditores e rendibilidade. Para medir a transparência, são usados os índices 
CIFAR e S&P, que acomodam aspectos distintos das divulgações 
(contabilidade, governo da sociedade, estrutura accionista e outros aspectos 
relevantes). 
Os resultados indicam que a dimensão das empresas, a rendibilidade e as 
ofertas de capital explicam de forma significativa a divulgação de informação, 
sugerindo que as empresas que apresentam maiores níveis de transparência 
tendem a ser as de maior dimensão e rendibilidade. Estes resultados suportam 
a hipótese de que a transparência é influenciada por algumas variáveis 
específicas das empresas. 
Seguidamente, são investigadas as consequências económicas da 
transparência, focalizada na volatilidade dos preços das acções. Baseada na 
informação dos relatórios anuais, a evidência não suporta a hipótese da 
relação entre transparência e volatilidade. Considerando os relatórios 
trimestrais, é encontrado, para o segundo trimestre, uma relação negativa e 
significativa entre as variáveis, sugerindo que a volatilidade das acções tende 
a diminuir em empresas com maior transparência.  
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abstract 
 
The stock markets facing rough competition should be transparent and fair. 
Consequently, the purpose from this dissertation is to investigate the main 
causes of the information transparency as well as its consequences for the 
market, namely the stock price volatility. 
This concern led to an analysis of the disclosure practices by 86 non-financial 
firms of Euronext Lisbon and Brussels, considering a matching sample of 
Portugal and Belgium non financial listed of firms for the year of 2008. The 
choice was made concerning the capital market size and the fact that both 
countries belong to Euronext NV. 
Firstly, it is analyzed the relationship between transparency and a set of 
variables, such as the firm size, leverage, audit and profitability. To measure 
the transparency, are used CIFAR and S&Ps indices, which accommodate 
different aspects of disclosure (accounting, corporate governance, ownership 
structure and other relevant aspects). 
The results show some variables that significantly explain the disclosure, such 
as the firm size, profitability and equity offer, suggesting that firms which 
present higher levels of transparency tend to be the ones of larger size and 
higher profitability. This could imply that transparency is influenced by some 
firm specific variables.  
Furthermore, it is studied the economic consequences of transparency, 
focusing on the stock price volatility. Based on annual reports information, the 
evidence does not support the hypothesis of a relation between transparency 
and volatility. Considering the quarterly reports, it is find, for the second quarter, 
a negative and significant relation between the variables, suggesting that the 
higher the transparency, the lower the stock price volatility. 
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1. Introduction 
In a society depending on real time information, the disclosure by firms has several 
important contributes for the companies themselves, their financial structure and for investors. The 
market stability could be explained by the firm’s transparency. The policy of disclosure depends on 
the firms: some of them freely divulging it, sometimes widely than what is stipulated by law, others 
maintaining the information as secret as they are allowed.  
Consequently, the report of information disclosed by a company seems to be an important 
decision, with important consequences for the market. The characteristics of the information made 
available for all investors are an important key for the market efficiency. These are enough and 
important reasons to analyze the firms´ approach to the release of information in the Portuguese 
capital market. 
On this subject, Akerlof (1970) introduced the concept of information asymmetry referring 
to the practice of withholding information in order to influence the behaviour of  uncaptioned 
agents The so-called “lemons problem” points out precisely the asymmetric information and the 
conflicts of interest arising from, in this case, companies and investors. These information problems 
will lead to inefficiency in the financial market. 
Therefore, disclosure could be considered as good or bad information, which can create 
flotation in share prices. The investors make decisions concerning disclosure, sometimes investing 
in ideas that are not, actually, good. Taking in account that most of shareholders cannot distinguish 
between a good or bad idea, underestimating the good ideas and overestimating the bad ones, 
those ideas become quality levelled and the “lemons problem” is not solved. 
To reduce the asymmetry reported by Akerlof, financial information is greatly appreciated 
by investors. In addition to financial information, companies also disclose operations of the 
company’s internal forum.  
The more disclosures a company makes, the more transparent becomes the information to 
investors and the company will have more credit in the market. Thus, the stock price might rise. 
The quality of that transparency may be also assessed by the information provided by the external 
quality auditors and the comments of the market financial analysts. 
The process of financial liberalization had its beginning in the early 70´s, but the integration 
in the European Community brought new rules to the financial markets, including the Portuguese 
one. The community rules between the countries and the subsequent single market for financial 
products and services cause some differences in the sophistication in the market. 
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The modifications created in the Monetary and Economic Union at the 1st of January from 
1999, changed also bonds and shares negotiation in the financial market. Bonds and shares market 
was improved, modernized and gradually gained more relevance, attracting internationals 
investment. Although still limited, the Portuguese market was improved and deeper explored.  
 The developments operated in the financial intermediary system affected not only the 
companies of the financial sector, but also the economy in a broad sense, allowing new 
achievements in the efficiency of this financial system.  
The financial sector always creates fluxes in the foreign investment and is a crucial item to 
the economic activities. The efficiency, transparency and liquidity in the exchange market generate 
satisfaction of the companies financing needs, with competitive costs. 
In this context, it will be analyzed the disclosure situation in Portugal. Are the Portuguese 
firms transparent, regarding the level of their disclosure? This question will be dealt using a 
comparison with another European country, Belgium.   
The examination here presented is conducted for Portugal in comparison with Belgium. This 
choice can be justified for several reasons. Firstly, all firms are listed on NYSE Euronext and have 
similar accounting regulation. Secondly, both this regulation and corporate governance are similar 
in both markets, what is explained by the spread of the International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
rules. Finally, the fact that the Belgian and Portuguese stock exchange markets are relatively small 
is an opportunity for good matching relations between them, as well. 
The purpose of the dissertation is to examine the influence of several indicators (such as 
size, leverage, profitability, the type of auditor and equity offer) on the transparency of the non-
financial listed firms in Portugal. As discussed later, firms have incentives to disclose until it is costly 
unbearable and strategically unsuitable, mainly when inside news are not good to disclose publicly. 
In addition, it is attempted to understand how the stock price volatility is modified in the presence 
of transparency modifications.  
The major contribution of this study is based on several reasons. Firstly, it is tried to explore 
the key role of transparency on Portuguese stock market. Secondly, it is tried to identify the 
determinants of transparency. Finally, it is analyzed two European small markets, which are in need 
of research. 
The structure of this dissertation is organized as follows.  In chapter 2 it is presented the 
literature review. Chapter 3 formulates the measures of the transparency and the differences 
between them, as well as a proposal for the sample selection and the relative procedures. This 
chapter also explains how stock markets were created and deals with perspectives of the 
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Portuguese and Belgian markets in the year of 2008. The results of the econometrics tests and the 
descriptive statistics are presented, analysed and discussed on chapters 4. The final section 
summarises and concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
The transparency concept was born half century ago, but it was in this first decade of the 21 
century it became unavoidable. The transparency related with business turns not only in a 
obligatory financial information from the regalements, but it is also an embraced concept. The 
concept means increasing access to information about all and any feature of the business 
performance by the all spectrum of stakeholders, i.e., all the economic and social agents linked to 
the company. 
To have an effective collaboration, the companies and their partners, share information 
and knowledge in order to be competitive. Apart from this spirit, there are some powerful 
institutional investors who hold or manage a large proportion of business and require a lot of 
information on their investments. Finally, in a global scale, instant communication is nowadays a 
critical asset for any financial partner.  All these points are reasons for the duty of transparency. 
Furthermore, transparency generates benefits not only for the companies, but also for the 
global welfare of economy. Foreign direct investment and private domestic investment are 
attracted by all information that may be provided and are as well related to the quality of the 
governance. The efficiency allocation of resources is more present when transparency is more 
effective. Going towards market expectations, it helps to build an environment of reliability. 
Foreign direct investment is increased when the corporate transparency increases (Seyoum, 2009, 
Bhardwaj et al., 2007, Beamish, 2007 and Razin and Sadka, 2007). For example, Bhardwaj et al. 
(2007) show that firms avoid certain countries to invest based on their cultural characteristics. The 
behavioural finance approaches also this subject with a bias that refers investors as non-rational 
agents, who will overweight the portfolios and tend to invest in a large amount of domestic 
equities, despite the purported payback of the foreign equities (Brandshaw et al., 2004 and Hiraki 
et al., 2003). Prior research points out that the main cause of home bias is the inability of many 
foreign firms to attract the initial attention of investors (Bradshaw et al., 2004). The inability to 
attract the investors could be eliminated with more efforts to improve financial reporting practices 
(Ding et al, 2008). 
Transparency is as well a source of costs reduction, namely the cost of capital reduces and 
the market liquidity increases (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The companies that are not transparent 
are associated with more transactions cost then the transparent ones, consequently, additional 
information needed to make an investment decision will have to be secured by extra costs 
(Seyoum, 2009). 
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It is important to refer that disclosure is not only possible because of the company’s desire. 
The mandatory disclosure is a large part of the company’s transparency, as discussed in a 
subsequent section, according to the accounting harmonization. The mandatory disclosure includes 
all the rules that are imposed to companies to exchange the relevant information and all the 
procedures regarding the financial information. The voluntary information is less and less frequent, 
because of the heavy requirements from the harmonized legislations, and it is all the information 
that companies give freely to investors without been required for the countries. This last type of 
information is more linked to ownership structure of the companies. 
2.1 The Disclosure of firms affect the behaviour of shareholders and consequently the price 
volatility 
The importance of information release by firms is quite imperative for the stock market. It 
is well documented the concern regarding the transparency of firms and their disclosure. Domestic   
investors as well as outsiders’ investors extract firm’s position and make a decision on the divulged 
data, deciding whether it is a good or a bad release. Disclosure is a way to provide the market with 
some liquidity, i.e., it could be said that the release of information via company raises market 
liquidity. On the other side, with a divergent perspective, some authors defend that market 
liquidity is inversely related to disclosure policy (Welker, 1995). That being the case, it will also 
reduce the cost of capital (Healy and Palepu, 2001). In their paper, Healy and Palepu (2001) made a 
compendium of empirical accounting literature in respect to disclosure, as well as a summary of the 
benefits. The main conclusion is that the quality of information created by the firm’s transparency 
has an influence in the financial markets, which could be explained by an augment of 
entrepreneurship and economic change. On the other hand, the traditional reports don’t work so 
well towards the transparency of the markets, as the changes made by the company are not 
effectively transmitted. 
Several authors found a negative relationship between capital cost and the level of 
disclosure. Botosan (1997) presented two main ideas: one showed by Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1991), suggesting that wider disclosure brings an increase of market liquidity, since the cost of 
capital decreases with the costs of transaction and the increase of demand by the firm’s bonds. The 
second theory, mentioned by Botosan (1997), supports that further disclosure will reduce the cost 
of capital, but the reason of that reduction is also the decrease of the non diversified risk. This 
suggestion was also addressed by Klein and Bawa (1976), Barry and Brown (1985), Handa and Linn 
(1993), Coles et al. (1995) and Clarkson et al. (1996). 
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Typically, several studies suggest that there is a positive effect in the capital market with a 
subsequent augment of disclosure. Botosan (1997), Sengupta (1998) and Botosan and Plumlee 
(2002) document this effect in relation to lower equity and debt costs.  
Using regression techniques on a sample of 122 industries, Botosan (1997) obtained 
estimations relating the cost of capital and the disclosure level. The author concludes that more 
reports from the market analysts in the firms don’t give any evidence in that relation; but situation 
of firms with lower announcing from the market analysts indicates that bigger disclosure is 
associated with a lower cost of capital.  
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) suggest that there is relevance in the type of disclosure. This 
study is a re-analyze of the Botosan (1997) paper. They mention a negative relation between the 
cost of capital and the level of disclosure in annual reports, using the US data, and a positive 
relation with the rankings of quarterly disclosures, with news announcements and other relations’ 
activities not associated to investors. According the authors, the larger level of timely disclosure will 
increase the cost of capital because it endorses the short-term trades which lead to bigger volatility 
of shares.  
Sengupta (1998) finds a negative relation between Association for Investment Management 
and Research (AIMR)1 disclosure scores and the Moody’s Bond Surveys measures’ of the cost of 
debt- bond yields. The study merged to the conclusion that the cost of debt reduces with bigger 
releasing of information.  
The effects in capital market could also be seen by the reaction to earnings displayed by 
bigger stock price (Price, 1998). At last, this association will lead to smaller bid-ask spreads 
documented in Welker (1995), Healy et al. (1999) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000). 
Previous literature focuses essentially on the announcement impact in the investors’ 
decisions. The Welker (1995) study sustains a relation between the asymmetry and the market 
liquidity. The author uses the bid-ask spreads to measure market liquidity, concluding that 
disclosure is negatively related with spreads. When market release information, it will be more 
symmetric in order of information, and the market become more liquid. 
Several studies achieved the conclusion that disclosure is the ultimate source of efficiency 
in a financial market and made some recommendations. The asymmetry of information is also a 
concern and it occurs as a result of the investors’ information and their different levels. Bigger 
asymmetry in the first disclosure creates a raise in the instant price. However, the maximum instant 
                                                          
1
 AIMR produced annual rankings of the corporate disclosure evaluations from several industries, up until 
1996. The categories in AIMR scores were annual report, quarterly and other reports and investor relation 
activities. 
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price has some asymmetry. The more homogeneous is the information, the better we will know 
about decisions on going out in the capital market (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). The asymmetry 
reduction created by the disclosure will also modify the cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991; Verrecchia, 2001 and Zhang, 2001), as explained in the paragraph above. 
If divulging increases, the necessary return by investors will decrease, that is, an opposite 
effect between them will occur, reducing the investors’ risks and some smoothing the volatility. 
Those conclusions were obtained by Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Elliot and Jacobson (1994), 
Coles et al. (1995), Botosan (1997, 2002, 2006) and Sengupta (1998). According to Botosan (2002), 
a higher frequency of disclosures could increase the cost of capital, probably through the increase 
of the stock price.  
Verrecchia (2001) concludes that the bigger the asymmetry of the market , the less efficient 
the market may be. With a larger spread of information, in a homogeneous way, there will be more 
opportunity for an option of efficient disclosure and more incentives to disclose. This all process will 
create a bigger action between the agents and more health in the capital market. That explanation 
comes in a line of beliefs that says that more important than the combination of efficiency and 
disclosure is the combination of disclosure and information asymmetry reduction.  
As mentioned before, the disclosure has an important impact in the cost of capital 
(Botosan, 1997 and Sengupta, 1998). Botosan (1997) estimates the cost of equity capital and 
concludes the disclosure index has a significant relation with the firm’s cost of capital in the firms 
scarcely followed by analysts and firms with high analysts following has no evidence in that 
relation. 
Meanwhile, Ang and Brau (2002) made an empirical study for 334 previous leveraged 
buyouts and a characteristic-matched control sample. They intended to test the proposition that a 
bigger level of transparency by a firm decreases the costs and changes the initial public offering on 
undisclosed topics. They conclude that there is evidence of different effects by disclosures when 
there are initial public offerings (IPO). Namely, firms that perform better and provide more 
information (more transparent) have lower costs to go public. This conclusion corroborates other 
previous studies. In addition, they conclude that larger private firms, planning to make free 
information available, should use ways to supply verification or certification of the quality of the 
disclosure. 
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2.1.1 Disclosures and price’s volatility 
Firm’s policy regarding the dividends is crucial for the stock prices and its volatility. Allen 
and Rachim (1996) put together 173 Australian companies for the period from 1972 to 1982.  They 
run a regression for stock price and the dividend policy measured by the firms’ size, volatility of 
earnings, leverage and growth. The authors find no evidence supporting a positive relationship 
between dividend changes and the subsequent share price reaction. Although this result is not 
consensual with the information content of dividend hypothesis and previous studies, such as the 
ones of Asquith and Mullins (1983) and Lee and Ryan (2000), it is in agreement with recent studies 
(Gunasekarage and Power, 2002 and Vieira and Raposo, 2007). The main determinants explaining 
the price are the volatility earnings and firms leverage. The investor’s payout is negatively related 
with price volatility. 
Pinto (2003) made a study on the disclosure of several factors that could influence the price 
and the trade volume. She uses the divulgations to understand if it has valuable information to the 
market and if it is efficiently incorporated on stocks prices. The results show that “good” and “bad” 
news cause an abnormal profitability around the event day. Consequently, the author found 
evidence of a semi-strong efficient market. The volume traded in the market was also abnormal, 
but the return to the stability was slower, i.e., the adjustments still go after the price returns to the 
equilibrium value.  
 Disclosures could influence the portfolios composition of investors (Bushee and Noe, 2000). 
The information reported by the company is integrated in their investments composition. Bushee 
and Noe analyzed how investors react to the company’s exposition of information, in the US 
market, and elaborated a report of all AIMR disclosure ratings. Better disclosure gives a good signal 
to the market, removing the uncertainty that exists because of the non-liberation of information. 
The release of information could reduce the magnitude of the impact of news about a firm’s 
performance. Furthermore, the circulation of information reduces the prices volatility. This effect 
on volatility depends as well on the type of investors involved in the firm. For instance, the so called 
“transitory institutions”, characterized for their aggressive trade, with a better disclosure will 
increase the stock return volatility.  
Alves and Santos (2005) analyzed 1751 earnings announcements of Portuguese firms in the 
period from 1994 to 2004, as well as the respective informativeness of quarterly financial reporting. 
Taking in consideration that European Union (EU) decided that firms do not need to report 
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information from the first and third quarters2, each one of the EU countries need to decide if their 
firms should be obliged or not to disclose that information. In the Portuguese case, firms must 
disclosure such information in all quarters. The results suggest that the first and third quarters 
information is also significantly related with price volatility and trading volume, suggesting 
informativeness of financial reporting for all the quarters.  
2.1.2 Disclosures and firm’s value 
The relation between information releases and the firms’ value has been studied by several 
authors. Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988), in a theoretical framework, studied the determinants 
of the magnitude of the sudden prices changes reactions to the information send towards the 
market. The relationship was analyzed by a series of two disclosures (transmitting the real 
distribution of risks and the noise) on two risky assets. The conjuncture of the market, regarding 
the settlement of assets dividends, means that prices change with a second disclosure. There is, 
subsequently, a great movement of prices. In short, the variance in price could be explained by the 
variance of the underlying cash flows, the quality of the first information released, and the inter-
temporal and cross-sectional correlation in the noise of the information. 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), based on a sample of 102 firms of the DAX-100 stock index 
over the year of 1998, conclude that when the level of disclosure increases, the information 
asymmetry declines. They also conclude that the release of information to the market brings 
welfare to the firm’s economy. This could be explained by a decrease of the cost of capital, 
reducing the cost to acquire the information. Concerning the price volatility, the authors believe 
that international reports can’t reduce share price volatility. 
One more explanation emerges concerning the divulgation of information and the 
relationship with the value’s firm. Diamond (1985) state that there are two effects to explain the 
existence of deliberated disclosure, when acquiring private information is costly, being one positive 
and the other negative. The disclosure will affect the costs of private information and the risk 
allocation. The cost of private information acquirement is reduced by disclosure. In the same way, 
disclosure affects in a bad way the risk distribution. Accordingly to Diamond, it could be said that 
the release of information brings a benefit to shareholders and not a loss. This assumption is 
justified by the cost that is saved in the open information and the mentioned share in the risk. This 
                                                          
2
 Directive 2004/109/EC, from December, 15, 2004 (Transparency Directive). 
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theory of the disclosure in firms announces is subscribed by other authors (Collins and Salatka, 
1993; Kim, 1993; Welker, 1995; Botosan, 1997 and Hail and Leuz, 2009).  
Information is always related with good news coming out from the firms, but bad news has 
to come out too. Skinner (1994) analyzed the disclosure of bad news. The detention of bad news 
causes the company to incur in more legal costs. In fact, Skinner says that the incentive to pre-
disclose information in bad earnings is bigger to firms with regular situation, reducing the costs of 
litigation. This benefit can be explained because of the premature disclosure of bad news. The 
decline of prices is done on various dates, and not abruptly. This decline occurs prior to the release 
of results. There is a reduction in incentives for disclosure with the litigation, including forward-
looking information. 
Other perspective of disclosure arises in Healy and Palepu (1993). The key findings from the 
authors could be explained by a trade-off that firms need to do in disclosure. If firms disclose a lot 
of information they would have more costs and the benefits, removed by that release, may not be 
enough to cover the costs. The trade-off in the company needs to be seen as a strategy that will 
optimize the liberation of information. That theory is denominated buy “The inverted-U model” 
related in Nam et al. (2009). This designation may be explained because of the inverted-U shape of 
the graphic of the relationship between information disclosure and firm value, as well as with 
performance.  
Inverse relation among costs of disclosure and firms transparency is suggested by Beatty 
and Ritter (1986). The firms from IPO do not give exhaustive information, but the information is 
regulated regarding amount, so that could lead to optimization. 
Some indirect costs could also rise because there is some attraction to institutional 
investors that will result in more volatility of the price (Bushee and Noe, 2000). 
A different perspective arises in Armitage and Marston (2008) work. The authors conduct a 
set of interviews about disclosure to finance directors. The interviews results with the finance 
directors describing their point of view. The main perspective is that, giving disclosure to the 
market (to the investors), the costs of equity will be reduced, but only until “good-practice level of 
communication has been reached”. This last affirmation is justified by the almost absence of effect. 
This perspective conducts to a couple of remarks: the companies are recognized as an open 
company and the release of information also give credibility and trust to investors.  
Lin et al. (2007) analyze the relationship between transparency and the informativeness of 
accounting earnings, using a sample of listed firms on the Taiwan market, for the period between 
2003 and 2004. The results are not consensual, as a measure to study the transparency is not 
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always the same. The transparency of Taiwan market is measured by the ranking Information 
Transparency and Disclosure Ranking System (ITDRS), and the results show a reduction of the level 
of information of accounting earnings. However, using another proxy for the information 
transparency, the long-term investments, the results are an augment in earning, for the ones with 
more transparency. These results suggest that the ITDRS is not a good proxy for financial 
transparency. 
Other empirical study focused on financial transparency is from Ding et al. (2008). The 
authors analyze the Baltic region and compare it with Nordic countries, relevant because of their 
recognized improvements in transaction efficiency and transparency. They analyze 63 firms of 
Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and compared them with 58 firms from Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden). They use two proxies of financial transparency: the first 
one is regulated by the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) disclosures and the 
second one, in a broader sense, the voluntarily supplied disclosures on corporate governance and 
ownership characteristics. The main conclusion achieved in the comparison between the two 
regions is that Baltic countries have a lower level of financial transparency than the Nordic ones, as 
was predicted by the authors. The second measure is negatively related with the stock price 
volatility in the Baltic case. In Nordic countries, the first and second measure is both negatively 
related with volatility.  These two conclusions could be interpreted as follows: in the first case, 
relating the price with the importance of financial transparency, there is a reduction of stock price 
volatility with more transparency; in the second case, with an increase of financial transparency 
and also with more divulgation about ownership and governance, the price volatility will reduce. 
The Baltic investors are only interested in financial information, but in Nordic countries the release 
of information towards governance and ownership, will leave signs to the market to proceed on a 
buying or selling decision. 
2.2 Determinants of transparency 
Typically, financial disclosures are related to several firm-specific variables, such as the size 
of the company, capital intensity, firm performance and profitability, their auditors rating, whether 
the firms are or not listed outside the country, equity offer, leverage, the number of analysts 
following the company, and other determinants that could be related with the level of disclosure of 
the listed companies in a stock market exchange. Healy and Palepu (2001), for example, considered 
that there are six capital market reasons influencing the managers’ disclosure decisions: capital 
market transactions, corporate control contests, stock compensation, litigation, property costs and 
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management talent signalizing. In the next pages, the extant literature will be investigated, with 
revision of all these aspects that could influence the information transparency. 
In the next pages, a set of variables that could influence transparency are enumerated and 
analyzed. 
2.2.1 Capital Intensity 
According to the literature, it is expected a positive relationship between information 
transparency and capital intensity. Indeed, several empirical studies confirm this expectation, such 
as the ones of Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000). The former study shows 
that more visible firms have, generally, greater capital intensity. There are two common proxies 
used to measure the capital intensity: the ratio of the gross fixed assets over the sales (Belkaoui and 
Karpik, 1989) and the long-term assets scaled by total assets (Ding et al., 2008). 
2.2.2 Analysts 
In what concerns the analysts, it is expected a positive relationship between the firm’s 
disclosure and, consequently, their information transparency, and the number of analysts that 
follow the firms’ news. 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) found that information transparency and the number of analysts 
that track the firm are positively associated, suggesting that this association will turn around, 
because with higher disclosure, the analysts will be also more interested in the firm. 
A similar conclusion was revealed by Healy et al. (1999). They suggest that firms disclosing 
big ratings of information will catch less interest from the analysts in pursue of information about 
the firm, concerning the pre-event period. But after disclosure increases, the analysts will treat the 
company as the others in the industry and follow the information in the same level.  
2.2.3 Size 
The firm size is considered by the literature as one of the most important variable related 
with the level of transparency (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). In a broad sense, disclosures voluntarily 
revealed are positively related with firm size, which means that the bigger the companies, the 
higher the level of disclosure. A big company is more visible then a smaller one and have more 
information available in the market. The visibility of bigger firms pressures them to behave in a 
more transparent way. There is an increased price per share as firm size increases. If there is a deep 
asymmetry in information, the eagerness of free disclosures will raise the prices once they happen. 
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Another reason for larger firms to disclose more information is the lower costs with the release of 
information. Indeed, it could be assumed that they had to produce that information just for 
managers’ decisions (Singhvi and Desai, 1971).  
Hope (2003) uses size as a control variable, like several prior studies. His empirical research 
stands on the 1993 Market Value of Equity in order to measure the size of the company. This 
variable was also used by the author to proxy for the manager’s incentives. The author confirms 
prior studies’ evidence of a positive relation between this variable and the release of information. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) emphasize the firm size as an important characteristic to the 
level of disclosure, mentioned that the magnitude of the reported earnings will be higher in bigger 
firms. In addition, they find that firms with higher disclosure commonly have more developed 
systems of information. They state that the intervention from the governments in top size firms 
may create costs, but disclosure will reduce them.  
King et al. (1990) argue that disclosure will create an effect in the size of the company, 
based on the transactions costs. The higher the firm size, the higher will be the information 
disclosure, given the higher incentives to acquire private information. Specifically, the annual report 
could be seen as a source, inclusive, for competitors. A small firm is likely to disclose less because it 
can create disadvantages face their competitors. 
Several authors, such as Lang and Lundholm (1996), Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Taylor 
et al. (2008), found evidence that disclosure scores are related to firm size. The costs of disclosure 
will be higher in small companies. The interest of media in major corporations is higher and, 
consequently, the disclosure costs will be lower. In these studies, the proxy used in order to 
measure the size of the companies was the logarithm of the total assets, in accordance with the 
studies of Allen and Rachim (1996), Ding et al. (2008), Lopes and Rodrigues (2006), Taylor et al. 
(2008) and Cho et al. (2010). 
2.2.4 Profitability 
Several studies have documented a positive relation between the disclosure level and the 
profitability of the firm. Roberts (1992) concludes that the performance of the economy is 
positively related with information disclosure and social responsibility. The firms will increase the 
disclosure with the expectation of performance improvement. According to Armitage and Marston 
(2008), more information provided to the market improves the knowledge of the manager 
endowment to cause a better performance, maintains the share price and even decreases the cost 
of raising capital. The transparency depends on the firms’ rate of return: when it is low, the 
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managers disclose less to cover the skidding in their accountings; when the information is more 
transparent, with a higher return rate managers want to show their good results. 
Several researches supported this topic. Lang and Lundholm (1993) examined the AIMR 
disclosure scores and found a positive relation between them and the firm’s performance. The 
same conclusion was reached by Singhvi and Desai (1971) for their univariate test. However, for the 
multivariate test, this determinant appears to be non-significant. It might be that when profitability 
is tested alone or when tested with other variables, a case in what that influence may not show.  
Healy et al. (1999), based on a sample of 97 firms and collecting the AIMR disclosure scores, 
conclude that better performance is related with better voluntary disclosures. For the firm control 
variable (performance), they use contemporaneous earnings, although the variable does not 
capture all the market adjustment of the expected cash-flows. The relation mentioned behind, a 
positive influence between performance and transparency will lead to constant revisions from the 
expectations of the future cash-flows in the market and will reduce the spread. 
However, two years later, Healy and Palepu (2001) document a possible ambiguity in some 
empirical work done previously (Healy et al. 1999). To justify this fact, Healy and Palepu (2001, p. 
431) refer that “absence of a reliable model of the relation between performance and disclosure”. 
The consideration about the timing of changes in disclosure and the direction of causality are also 
valid critic, according the authors. If firms have higher disclosure when firm has positive results, the 
interest from the investors will increase. They are interested in the good performance and in the 
maximization of the company’s value, more than in the transparency of the firm. Therefore, high 
profits will persuade managers to disclose more, because they will be more motivated. With better 
results the information is more detailed to prolong the good managers moment and protect their 
position and remuneration. The opposite is also applied, the managers disclose less when the 
results are weak. 
2.2.5 Leverage 
 Modigliani and Miller (1963), Merton (1974) and Galai and Masulis (1975), among others, 
suggest that leverage will decrease with a capital emission. As a consequence of the debt fiscal 
advantage, the share price will decrease. In addition, the debt risk decreases and the wealthy will 
pass from the shareholders to the bondholders. 
 Branco (2006) studies both the corporate social responsibility and social responsibility 
disclosure, based on a sample of listed firms on Euronext Lisbon (EL) as well as on Portuguese 
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banks. Globally, the author does not find evidence of a significant relationship between leverage 
and disclosure. 
According Roberts (1992), the creditors’ power, in the role of stakeholders, depends on the 
degree the company relies on its debt financing. 
However, the results concerning the relationship between information disclosure and 
leverage are not consensual. Although some authors have found a positive relationship between 
the two variables (Choi, 1999; García-Ayuso and Larrinaga, 2003; Purushotaman et al., 2000; 
Roberts, 1992 and Taylor et al., 2008), others found a negative relation (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989 
and Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). Thus, the signal of the leverage variable is ambiguous. This 
ambiguity was analyzed by Purushothaman et al. (2000). They point that the leverage could leave 
to spread information in different ways because firms with higher levels of leverage will be nearest 
to their creditors, having different ways of divulging social responsibility.  
Usually, the leverage variable is measured by the ratio of total debt/total assets, as it is 
possible to see in the studies of Belkaoui and Karpik (1989), Depoers (2000), Branco (2006) and 
Ding et al. (2008), among others. 
2.2.6 Audits 
Audits, ascertain the reliability of information, providing assurance to investors that 
financial statements present the firm’s financial and economy situation in a fair and valid way. The 
fact that stock prices react to the announcements of earnings could indicate that investors assume 
that the financial information given by audits is reliable (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
Several studies suggest that to decrease the risk of litigation and to protect their name, 
auditors will supply higher-quality audits (for example, Singhvi and Desai, 1971 and Hope et al., 
2008).  It is expected that, the better the quality of audits, the higher the transparency of the firm. 
However, the evidence is not consensual. Singhvi and Desai (1971) show that companies 
audit by the “Big Eight” auditing firms are more transparent than the others. 
The audits indicator is a measure of the reliability of financial accounting disclosures, 
distinct, as a source, from the share of the total value audited in a country (Bushman et al., 2004). 
The most common proxies to measure this variable are the “Big 4”, “Big 5”, “Big 6” and “Big 8” 
(Hope, 2003; Ding et al., 2008; Hope et al., 2008 and Bushman et al., 2004).  
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Recently, Ding et al. (2008) used the “Big 4”3 proxy to measure the quality of audits, 
founding positive significant results for CIFAR.  
2.2.7 Equity Offer 
 The extant literature generally suggests that firms with equity offers have more incentive to 
disclose information than the firms without them. The suggestion made by Healy and Palepu (1993) 
is that managers with the concern of equity are aware that is very important to the issuer to create 
a good impression in the investors. The level of disclosure could be seen as a firm’s forward 
scenario, concerning equity and debt offers or even the acquisition of another company in a stock 
market operation. Therefore, investors need information from the firm to make a good forecast of 
the prospective investment. 
Lang and Lundholm (1997) document a significant increase in divulgations by the firms on 
the six months before a equity offer, particularly when managers have issues needing some 
discretion. Healy et al. (1999), conclude that companies with high ratings from the analysts have an 
atypical elevated frequency of successive public debt offers. 
2.2.8 Other Determinants 
Several studies have documented a positive relation between voluntary disclosure and firm 
size, financing needs, or firms’ performance. There are several measures of performance, such as 
the ownership dispersion and the fact that the firm is or not listed on foreign exchanges. 
Healy et al. (1999) found a positive relationship between disclosure level and some firm-
specific characteristics, such as institutional ownership, performance, analysts following and stock 
liquidity. 
Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) hypothesize that firms disclose social information on perceived 
social performance, economic performance, political visibility (size hypothesis) and contracting and 
monitoring costs (debt equity hypothesis). Inside these major general aspects, several determinants 
are distributed (leverage, dividends to unrestricted retained earnings, size, capital-intensity ratio, 
systematic risk, accounting return on assets and stock price return). 
In the present concept of transparency, it could not be ignored the fact that the location of 
a firm could generate differences in their transparency. Based in a sample of 30 countries for the 
year of 2001, Ding et al. (2007) conclude that country-level differences cause diversity in disclosure. 
                                                          
3
 BIG 4 are constituted with the audit companies: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche, Ernest & Young 
and KPMG. 
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Hope (2003) studies the firm’s disclosure among 22 countries. He analyzes the effects of the level of 
annual report disclosure and the degree of enforcement of accounting standards on the precision 
of analysts’ financial forecasts. The transparency of the annual reports revealed by firms is 
positively related with the analysts forecasts (thus, the quality of audits). There are several 
variations in the requirements concerning disclosure on a country-level. Hail and Leuz (2009) find a 
negative relationship between the cost of equity capital across countries and corporate disclosure. 
In addition, the results show lower levels of information asymmetry and a reduction on the equity 
risk premium. They found that listed firms in the US stock exchanges have lower costs of capital, in 
about 70 to 120 basis points. 
Bushman et al. (2004) document a negative relation between transparency and the extent 
of state-owned enterprises. The proxy used by the authors was the share of country-level output 
supplied by state-owned enterprises (SOE). Countries with bigger investment in SOE have more 
elevated ratings. 
Several studies suggest that complex institutional factors influence financial disclosure 
quality. For example, Ball et al. (2000) observe that companies on the common law, such as the 
U.K. and U.S. firms, trust on the public shareholders and creditors for financing. Countries with 
code law, usually, have companies that rely on managers, banks, employees and governments as a 
resource for capital.  
Branco (2006) incorporates the information disclosed in the social responsibility disclosure 
(SDR) and the corporate social responsibility (CSR). He analyzes the impact of Internet on the 
company’s SDR. This study provides further knowledge about Portuguese situation concerning SDR. 
Disclosure was analyzed according several items – environment, human resources, products and 
customers and community involvement. Analyzing the influences in disclosure, a series of 
determinants are revealed, namely quoting, international experience, size, media exposure, 
consumer proximity, environmental sensitivity, profitability and leverage. The results show a 
significant relationship between total SDR and the following variables: media exposure, size and 
international experience (the last at 10% level). The coefficients on leverage and profitability were 
not statistically significant.  
Lopes and Rodrigues (2006) analysed the variables that could cause a change in disclosure. 
Considering the changes in Portuguese accounting, with the adoption of International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) after 2005 the authors analyzed the determinants from the companies which are 
closer to the disclosure requirements of the IAS. The authors found that size, type of auditor, listing 
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status and economic sector are significantly correlated with disclosure. However, they find no 
significant coefficients for corporate governance and the financing structure variables. 
 In this context, it will be determined the transparency of the Portuguese listed firms on EL 
using the following variables: size, profitability, country, leverage, audits and equity offers. 
Table 1 presents a synthesis of the main results obtained in the studies analyzed before, 
concerning the variables cited in this session. 
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Table 1: Results of previous studies on disclosure 
 
Determinant Authors Country Findings 
Size 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
Allen and Rachim (1996) 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) 
Branco (2006) 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
Hope (2003) 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2006) 
Ding et al. (2008) 
Cho et al. (2010) 
United States 
United States 
Australia 
United States 
Portugal 
United States 
22 countries
4
 
Portugal 
Baltic and Nordic Region 
United States 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Leverage 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) 
Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) 
Branco (2006) 
Roberts (1992) 
Choi (1999) 
Purushotaman et al. (2000) 
García-Ayuso and Larrinaga (2003) 
Mexico  
United States  
Portugal 
United States 
Korea, Rep. 
Singapore 
Spain 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Profitability 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
Roberts (1992) 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) 
Healy et al. (1999) 
United States 
United States 
United States 
AIMR 
+/- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Audits 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
Hope (2003) 
Bushman et al. (2004) 
Ding et al. (2008) 
Hope et al. (2008) 
United States 
22 Countries 
46 countries
5
 
Baltic and Nordic Region 
14 countries
6
 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Equity Offer 
Lang and Lundholm (1997) 
Healy et al. (1999) 
United States 
AIMR 
+ 
+ 
(+) significantly correlated, (-) non-significantly correlated, +/- ambiguous 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,  South Africa,  Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
United States. 
5
 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Nigeria, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
6
 Australia, Denmark, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
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2.3 Stock price Volatility and transparency 
The implications of transparency in the economy are broadly documented in the literature. 
The stock price volatility is one of the best documented. The relationship between transparency 
and volatility is negative, which means that with an increase of disclosure the stock price volatility 
will be smoother. This relation could be justified by several reasons. Firstly, the information 
asymmetry, corresponding to a reduced spread of disclosure, decreases with more transparency 
and therefore allows some smoothing of the stock price volatility. Secondly, if the investors know 
are regularly informed of the situation of the company, the impact of company news about its 
performance will decrease- the behaviour of investors will be less “nervous”. Finally, with more 
transparency the value of a company will be more consensual for the investors, thus the volatility 
will be reduced. 
A number of studies investigated the link between disclosure and their impact on share 
prices. The impact on prices can be small, being the dispersion reduced, or it might cause constant 
changes in the stock prices, handing to high volatility. 
There is a general agreement that the quality of disclosure and transparency could diminish 
the firms’ stock price volatility what can motivate companies to disclose more information. 
For instance, Bushee and Noe (2000) document a higher volatility in small companies and 
justify it with a “corporate disclosure”, which is measured by the ratings of AIMR. A corporate 
disclosure is more appellative for investors with more aggressive strategies and that will lead to 
more volatility. In this empirical research, they stated that not only the aggressive investors tend to 
magnify and detract the price quicker, but also the institutional investors with large portfolios have 
a propensity to invest in more transparent firms. Moreover, higher quality in disclosure is more 
likely to reduce volatility of future stock return, with the appeal to long term investors. This effect is 
compensated with higher disclosure ratings which are negatively linked to future stock return on 
volatility. This leads to the conclusion that smooth behaviour on the stock price decreases the 
firms’ cost of capital. 
Leuz and Verrechia (2000) find that German firms’ principles are accepted, in terms of 
accounting from German to USA, in what could be defined as an increase of disclosure.  
Lee and Chung (1998) analyzed 54 small listed firms in the Korean Stock Market, based on 
stocks’ daily closing prices and turnovers, for the period from 1991 to 1993. The authors test 
empirically the effect of open limit order book on the stock market. Lee and Chung (1998, p. 28-29) 
formulate the hypothesis “... if the open limit order book had no effect on stock prices, there would 
be no differences in variance of automated and non-automated stock returns. If any differences are 
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found, it is evident that the open limit order book can change stock market volatility”. The results 
show no differences in the mean returns, so, the authors conclude that open limit order book 
reduces stock market volatility. Furthermore, if the disclosure is correct and fast, there will be a 
smoothing of volatility in the stock prices, which leads to a more efficient market with fair prices. 
Consequently, the liquidity of stock markets will increase. 
Baumann and Nier (2004) explore the financial sector, through the analysis of 591 banks, 
from 1993 to 2000. They found a negative effect from disclosure on the volatility, consistent with 
other studies, such as the ones of Lee and Chung (1998) and Bushee and Noe (2000). To measure 
the disclosure, the authors created an index similar to CIFAR, but more shaped to bank disclosure 
information. The volatility itself is a source to evaluate the uncertainty in the financial markets and 
the consequences in the economy of disclosure. 
Frutos and Manzano (2005), using a two-stage model trading, compare a transparent 
market with an obscure market. The trades of transparency made after the first stage are analyzed. 
The differences reported in the strategy have a larger impact in the opaque market than in 
transparent market, which results in more volatile prices, generates price dispersion and decreases 
the price efficiency.  
Looking from the perspective of the value and glamour stocks earning announcements as 
well as the consequences on the stock prices, La Porta et al. (1997) reveal that post-formation 
earnings announcement returns are superior for valuable stocks than for glamour stocks, in the US 
stock market, for the period between 1971 and 1993. 
As it is possible to see through the empirical studies analyzed so far, globally, with more 
transparency, the asymmetry in the investors’ information is reduced, and, consequently, the stock 
price will be less volatile. 
2.4 Control Variables for Stock price volatility 
 Next, it is presented the variables explain the volatility of the stock price, namely the 
dividend yield, market-to-book, profitability, leverage, size and ownership. 
2.4.1 Dividend Yield 
The dividend payout ratio may signalize the quality of the firm and thus can be associated 
with low volatility. The higher the dividend yield, the lower will be the risk. Consequently, the 
expected sign for this variable is negative. Indeed, previous empirical researches find out a 
significant and negative relationship between Dividend Yield and Stock Price volatility such as Allen 
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and Rachim (1996) for the Australian stock market. However, other studies find no evidence of a 
significant value for the coefficient on dividend payout, such as the study of Ding et al. (2008), for 
the Baltic and Nordic Regions and the one of Bauman and Nier (2004) that analyzed 31 countries7.  
2.4.2 Market-to-Book 
 Stock price volatility is also influenced by the market-to-book ratio (MB), used as a proxy for 
growth predictions, which is associated with more volatility in the future (Fama and French, 1992; 
La Porta et al., 1997 and Berkman et al., 2002). Hence, the expected signal for this coefficient is 
positive. However, Ding et al. (2008) find ambiguous results. The coefficient on MB ratio is not 
statistically significant for the Baltic market results and for S&Ps indices, in the Nordic region. 
However, it is significant for CIFAR indices in the Nordic region. 
2.4.3 Profitability 
 The empirical evidence support the hypothesis that investors are more sensitive to 
information disclosure when it contains good news about firms performance than when the news 
are considered bad from the investors point of view, leading to a quicker and larger stock price 
reaction. 
Supporting this hypothesis, Baumman and Nier (2004), study several banks reports across 
countries, and find a significant relationship between profitability and stock price volatility, 
suggesting that the better the firm firms performance, the lower will be the stock price volatility. 
More recently, Ding et al. (2008) find a significant relation between the two variables for the Baltic 
region and for S&Ps index on Nordic countries, and a non significant value for the CIFAR- based 
disclosure variable.  
2.4.4 Leverage 
 According Modigliani and Miller (1963), more leveraged in the firm’s financial structure is 
associated with a higher volatility on the equity returns. Consequently, higher debts to equity ratio 
will growth the return volatility. Thus, the expected sign for this coefficient is positive. 
 However, the empirical results are not consensual. Although Allen and Rachim (1996), 
Baumann and Nier (2004) and Fama and French (1992) found a significant value for leverage 
                                                          
7
 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. 
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variable, Berkman et al. (2002) and Ding et al. (2008) found no significant relationship between 
firms leverage and the stock price volatility. 
2.4.5 Size 
 Larger firms are more likely to have less stock price elasticity than smaller ones. Thus, 
smaller size companies are more sensitive to stock price volatility. A concept was raised in the early 
70’s and described as “thinness” as “being inversely related to the size of the market for the equity 
shares of a particular corporation” (Cohen et al., p. 733). The market that is “thin” can increase the 
volatility and the cost of capital for individual firms. 
 Several prior studies have documented a negative and significant relation between size and 
the volatility of stock prices, investors will trust more on firms with bigger size and the reaction in 
terms of price dispersion will be less significant. Several empirical studies found a negative and 
significant relation between the variables, such as the case of Allen and Rachim (1996), Baumann 
and Nier (2004), Yumei et al. (2008) and Ding et al. (2008), but only for the Nordic Region.  
 Table 2 presents a summary of the main results obtained by the studies focused on stock 
price volatility, and cited before. 
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Table 2: Results of previous studies on the volatility price literature 
 
Variables Authors Country Findings 
Transparency La Porta et al. (1997) 
Lee and Chung (1998) 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
Bauman and Nier (2004) 
Bushee and Noe (2000) 
Ding et al. (2008) 
“ 
US 
Korea 
German 
31 countries
8
 
 
Baltic Region 
Nordic Region 
  
  
  
  
  
  
+/- 
  
Size Allen and Rachim (1996) 
Baumann and Nier (2004) 
Ding et al. (2008) 
“ 
Yumei et al. (2008) 
Australia 
31 countries 
Baltic Region 
Nordic Region 
China 
  
  
  _ 
  
  
Leverage Fama and French (1992) 
Allen and Rachim (1996) 
 Berkman et al. (2002) 
Baumann and Nier (2004) 
Ding et al. (2008) 
United States 
Australia 
United States 
31 countries 
Baltic and Nordic 
Region 
  
  
  _ 
  
  _ 
Profitability Baumann and Nier (2004) 
Ding et al. (2008) 
“ 
31 countries 
Baltic Region 
Nordic Region 
  
  
+/- 
Market-to-book Fama and French (1992) 
Ding et al. (2008) 
“ 
United States 
Baltic Region 
Nordic Region 
  
_ 
+/- 
Dividend Yield Allen and Rachim (1996) 
Bauman and Nier (2004) 
Ding et al. (2008) 
Australia 
31 countries 
Baltic and Nordic 
Region 
  
  _ 
  _ 
() significantly correlated, (_) non-significantly correlated, +/- ambiguous 
 
2.5 Ownership Structure 
The demand for information in the stock markets could reveal an aspect that might be 
important in the transparency of a company, i.e., the ownership structure. This demand for the 
structure of the companies’ ownership generates the need of good quality accounting information 
by the diversified ownership (Ding et al., 2007). 
Previous empirical studies found a negative association between disclosure and ownership 
concentration (Fan and Wong, 2002; Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Lakhal, 2007 and Laidroo, 2009).  
                                                          
8
 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. 
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When the ownership structure is highly concentrated, there is less demand of information, 
which is released not so often and with lower quality. 
In Portugal, firms have a concentrated ownership. Even in EL, there are several firms that 
were familiar and small, and during the process of growth and expansion became listed. But the 
first owners stayed with a big share from the company and hold a huge influence in the decisions, 
because of their participation in the equity and their voting rights. Thus, it seems right to expect 
that firms with more concentrated ownership will have less transparency.  
Table 3 summarizes the studies mentioned before, that analyze the variable ownership and 
its relation with transparency and disclosure. 
 
Table 3: Overview of Empirical Studies on Association between Ownership and Disclosure 
 
Ownership 
structure variable 
Study Country Study sign 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
Arcay and Vázquez (2005) Spain - 
Lakhal (2007) France - 
Fan and Wong (2002) East Asia - 
Laidro (2009) 
Baltic (Tallinn, Riga and 
Vilnius Stock Exchange) 
- 
 (-) non-significantly correlated 
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3. Methodology and data 
3.1 Hypotheses 
This study focused on two main questions, which are the following: 
- Is the transparency dependent from a set of variables that are characteristics from a 
company? 
- Is the economic situation modified by the existent transparency? 
 
In order to answer these questions, two hypotheses were formulated. The first hypothesis 
relates transparency and firm-specific variables, and was formulated as follows: 
H1: The transparency is positively associated with size, country, leverage, profitability, 
auditor or equity offer, and negatively associated with ownership 
The second one relates transparency and volatility and was formulated in the following 
manner: 
H2: The companies with bigger transparency scores would have lower volatility. 
In order to test these hypotheses, it is developed the methodology presented now.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
In order to analyze the phenomenon of the transparency, it is chosen the proxies to 
measure transparency. Consequently, and  focused on the explanation of transparency and 
volatility, it is considered two different models: the first explaining transparency and the relevant 
factors associated with this phenomenon and the second one examining the relationship between 
stock price volatility and some variables associated with it.  
3.2.1 The disclosure indices 
According Botosan (1997), annual reports are good proxies for the spread of information, 
because annual report levels are positively correlated with the amount of disclosure provided via 
other media (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). This connection between the transparency indices and 
disclosure is documented by Singhvi and Desai (1971) and Lang and Lundholm (1993), with both 
studies revealing strong and corroborative results.  
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Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to measure the disclosure level because the application of 
the index could be slightly subjective. Also, every item is not necessarily relevant to all companies. 
Raffournier (1995) stated that there is a framework of indices being not relevant.  
To measure transparency, it is calculated two indices, based on two measures used in prior 
studies: the first one based on the Center for International Financial Analysis & Research (CIFAR) 
and the second one based in Standard & Poor’s Transparency & Disclosure index (S&Ps). These 
indices are based on the information provided in firms’ annual reports to investors, for the fiscal 
year 2008. 
The two indices show different aspects concerning the disclosure and transparency from 
two features: one is more concerned with the accounting and the other more concerned with the 
ownership structure9. On one hand, the CIFAR measure enhances items specifically regulated. For 
example, in accounting, as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or GAAP, it 
includes general information, items from the income statement, balance sheet and cash flow, 
accounting standards, stock data, governance data and special items. On the other hand, S&Ps 
reveal the contribution to transparency from ownership structure, such as financial stakeholder 
rights, the Board structure and the process of placing. 
The measures are dichotomous, or the information is disclosed in the firm’s Annual Reports 
(case 1), or the information is not provided (case 0) and in a small cases, when the disclosure of 
information is irrelevant and is not provided (case Excluded). The Appendix 1 gives a more specific 
explanation of the disclosure scores. The items take in consideration amounts to a total of 174 for 
each company. Hence, it was constructed only analysing the annual reports a total of 15.834 
singular data for the transparency measures. It is used the annual reports, but there other sources 
that firms use to disclose information, for instance, the communication with analysts of material 
information and to the press. 
The total points obtained by a specific firm are computed, for the two indices, by the 
following formulas:  
                
  
                              [1]             
                                                                        
  
   [2]             
                                                          
9
 To understand better this index consult “Standard & Poor’s Corporate Governance Scores- Criteria and 
Definitions”, July, 2002, MacGraw-Hill.  
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The sums of        , measuring CIFAR, and         , measuring S&Ps, go through the 
total number of points awarded to the firm   for all the questions   , with          for CIFAR and 
         for S&Ps based index. Appendixes 1, 2 and 3 explain the procedure of scoring. 
3.2.2 Transparency Model 
According prior literature, it is expected that transparency will be explained by the 
following variables: 
                                                                         
Consequently, the following regression model is estimated: 
                                                             
                                  [3] 
where: 
Transparency = Disclosure score based on one of two indices (CIFAR or S&Ps index); 
Portugal = Dummy variable that takes the value one if the company is Portuguese 
and zero otherwise; 
Size = Logarithm of total assets (in Euros); 
Leverage = Ratio of total debt over total assets; 
Profitability = Return on Equity (ROE) of the firm divided by ROE of the industry; 
Auditor = Dummy variable that take the value one if the company is audited by a 
Big 4 firm and zero otherwise; 
Equity Offer = Dummy variable that take the value one if the company arranged an 
equity offer during 2008, and zero otherwise; 
   = Error term. 
 
The variable ownership structure is included in the model to understand the variables that 
explain the release of information and consequently the transparency. The relation between the 
ownership and transparency is not yet well documented. Ownership is measured by the 
aggregation of the voting rights of the three biggest shareholders of the company. In a few cases, 
when that information is not available, it is assumed that each voting right corresponds to a 
percentage of ownership from the shareholders. The data from this variable was found in the 
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annual reports from the companies, in 2008, or, alternatively, on Euronext website or on the 
Amadeus Database. 
3.2.3 Volatility Model 
In what concerns the volatility, it is examined whether transparency and stock price 
volatility are related with each other. In addition, it is considered a set of control variables. 
                             
The volatility model can be formulated as follows:  
                                                               
                                                                                                                                                      [4] 
where: 
Volatility = 
Standard deviation of share prices calculated from end-of-week 
share prices; 
MB = 
End-of-the-year capitalization divided by book value of total 
common equity; 
DYield = Dividend Yield , dividend per share divided by year-end stock price; 
IndFeffects = Fixed Effects for eight industry sectors; 
   = Error term. 
 
In what concerns the Portuguese market, the ROE of the industry was obtained in Banco de 
Portugal and was classified according the Portuguese Classification of the Economic Activities (CAE) 
sectors. For the robustness reasons, the Profitability was measured only with the ROE of firm, and 
the results were quite similar in the two methodologies, so the conclusions do not change. 
Consequently, it was decide to use the industry ROE mean adjusted. 
3.2 The Sample 
In order to analyse the transparency of the Portuguese market, and to compare it with the 
Belgian market, it is used a sample of non-financial listed companies on the Euronext Lisbon (EL) 
and on the Euronext Brussels (EB), respectively. It is excluded the financial firms because those 
companies should obey to strict legal requirements regarding their finance (Gaud et al., 2003). The 
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firms chosen in this sample are presented in Appendix 4 and 5, and data was collected on the 2008 
annual reports.  
Belgian firms could provide a good match because they are also listed in Euronext N.V. and 
have a similar size to matching with the Portuguese capital market. The presence of both countries 
in Euronext will create similar accounting standards, namely because the adoption of IFRS in 2005. 
Firstly, was tried to obtain the annual reports from the firm’s websites. When some kind of 
information was not found, particularly, the annual individual reports, was tried to obtain the data 
from the website of the Portuguese committee of the securities market, Comissão do Mercado de 
Valores Mobiliários (CMVM).  
The Portuguese final sample consists of 45 non-financial firms (of the 56 listed on EL). For 
all the sample firms, the fiscal year 2008 finish in 31 of December, except the football clubs, which 
finishes at 30 of June, so, for these last cases, it is analyzed the annual report from the season 
2007/2008. 
The Portuguese sample was matched with the Belgium sample, considering the firms 
industry and size. The Belgian market is bigger than the Portuguese one, presenting a higher 
volume of traders, as well as more investors. The total listed firms on EB amounts to 229. Removing 
the financial firms, there are already 171 listed firms. Thus, the number of non-financial listed firms 
is much bigger than the 45 firms listed on EL.  
 To create a proportion in these two markets, is used the matching method. From the 229 
firms listed on the EB, only 171 are non-financial firms, listed only on EB. After removing the non-
financial firms, as well as the ones simultaneously listed on other stock Exchanges, the sample was 
grouped according the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB)10 industry. Finally, it is obtained the 
Belgian matched sample, according the size of the companies.  
Four of the Belgian firms, in the Basic Materials, Consumer Goods and Utilities sectors were 
used twice as a matching pair for some of the Portuguese firms because of the lack of Belgian 
companies, namely in what concerns the industry and size criteria.  
It was adopted a similar approach to the one of Ding et al. (2008), who analyze a sample of 
63 Baltic firms, and compare them with 58 Nordic firms (Denmark, Finland and Sweden). 
Consequently, it is possible to compare these results and their results. 
 To apply the methodology, it is used the econometric programme Eviews 7.0. 
                                                          
10
 Euronext classify the firms in ICB industries, such as Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer 
Goods, Health Care, Consumer Services, Telecommunications, Utilities, Financials and Technology. 
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 The Figure 1 presents, schematically, a summary of the objective of this dissertation, as well 
as the hypotheses formulated and the methodology used to study that goal. 
 
Figure 1: Thesis approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STARTING QUESTIONS: 
Is the transparency dependent from a set of variables that are characteristics 
from a company? 
Is the economic situation modified by the existent transparency? 
 
H1 : The transparency is positively associated with the  
size, country, leverage, profitability, auditor and equity 
offer, and negatively  associated with ownership. 
H2 : The transparency scores are negatively associated 
with volatility. 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
CONCLUSIONS 
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3.3 The Stock Exchange and the conjuncture of the Portuguese and Belgian Markets 
3.3.1 Portuguese Stock Exchange 
In Portugal, since middle Age, the increasing of trade transactions induced a wider contact 
between merchants. That presence in Lisbon of so many merchant different countries attracted 
foreign merchant brokers, speaking different languages and therefore facilitating themselves the 
transactions of goods and capital. 
Despite several attempts before the eighteenth century, Lisbon Brokers had their activity 
regulated only since the 1st of January 1769, the day the Lisbon Stock Exchange (LSE) was installed. 
Nearly a century later, the Porto Stock Exchange (PSE) was created.  
During more than three quarters of the twentieth century, the Portuguese securities 
market had a low activity, the vast majority of securities, including shares, not being subject to 
negotiation. Stock prices were very rarely recorded in the bulletin of the Stock Exchange, with the 
exception of the shares of large companies involved in the financial sector.  
From the 60’s until the early 70’s, the highest growth of the Portuguese economy in the 
twentieth century allowed an increase of the capital markets, which remained particularly active 
from 1972 until the April Revolution. Despite an international economic recession caused by the oil 
shock of 1973, the worst crisis phase of the capital market in Portugal came up with the seizure of 
political power by the military on April 25, 1974.  
On April 29, 1974, there was a heavy blow to the SEL and Porto when all operations on 
securities were suspended by a decision of the Committee for National Salvation. Two years after, 
sessions were resumed on the LSE for trading of bonds. On February 28, 1977, the operations of all 
securities listed on the LSE were reopened and, in 1981, sessions were resumed as well on the PSE.  
A fundamental shift in the Portuguese capital market occurs in 1985, when the Finance 
Minister, Miguel Cadilhe, invites a number of companies to enter the Portuguese stock market, 
conceding a major package of tax benefits for issuers and investors.  
Following this initiative, some operations began to emerge on the market, showing a new 
dynamism of the Stock Exchanges in Portugal. Particularly, the first public offer in Portugal appears 
in 1986 on the PSE and, in the same year, the first bid occurs on the LSE. Porto seizes the first 
privatization process in Portugal, in 1989, and, April 10, 1991, sees the publication of the Securities 
Code ("Sapateiro s Law”), with the transference of the Stock Exchanges of Lisbon and Porto with its 
assets to the respective Stock Exchange associations.  
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On January 4, 1999, trading in shares and shares of investment funds cease to be made in 
Escudos to be done in Euros. From then, any negotiation, price quotations and settlement of 
transactions are made in Euros.  
In the same year, in December, the General Assembly of the two existing Stock Exchanges 
associations occurred simultaneously: the LSE Association and of Porto Derivatives Exchange 
Association. The merger was decided as well the transformation into one limited company. The 
new company took the designation of “Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa e Porto (BVLP) - Sociedade 
Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, SA”. This company became responsible for managing the 
money and regulated derivatives markets, as well as of other non-regulated markets when properly 
authorized for their activity.  
Early in March 2000, there was a change in the regulation of money market with the 
introduction of new trade rules, better suited to the market requirements. A group of laws were 
revoked, among them the fundamental law on the organization and operation of the Securities 
Market Securities Code, commonly known as "Sapateiro’s Law”. 
On June 13, 2001, the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding was held between 
BVLP and Euronext NV and, on December 13, an agreement was achieved on the financial terms of 
the "merger." By the end of January, the shareholders agreed unanimously with the conditions of 
the merger between Euronext NV and BVLP.  
On February 6, 2002, BVLP changes officially its name to Euronext Lisbon. And, on 
September 2, 2002, members of Euronext Lisbon became capable of exchanging, in the spot 
market, all the products quoted on the markets Euronext Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels. Finally, it 
was created the NYSE Euronext, with the merger of Euronext NV and NYSE. 
3.3.2 Brussels Stock Exchange 
 The Brussels Stock Exchange was founded in Brussels, Belgium, in the early nineteenth 
century by Napoleonic decree in 1801. In this initial system, ruled by French administration, the 
brokers had the monopoly of the deal of government securities. 
The big development in industry and economy in the middle of the nineteenth century 
(1851) raised a stronger and bigger bourse. A new building was constructed by the necessity of 
larger space and to accommodate the new needs. The new exchange was finalized in 1874 and 
replaced in the site of Récollets Convent. From 1867 to 1935 there were no laws in respect to 
market regulation. This free competition was over in 1935 with the consequences of the Great 
Depression and a set of laws regulating the market. 
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The Financial Transactions and Markets Act was legislated in 1990 to modernize and make 
competitiveness on the stock market. On September 22, 2000, the Brussels Stock Exchange was 
renamed Euronext Brussels and merged with Paris Bourse, Lisbon Stock Exchange and the stock 
exchanges of Amsterdam, to form Euronext N.V., the first pan-European exchange for equities and 
derivates, with common trading and clearing of all products. BEL 20 is now the most popular index 
in the Brussels Stock Exchange. 
3.3.3 Portuguese Evolution in 2008 
The year 2008 was deeply marked by heavy losses in stock markets on a global scale. In the 
same context of economic and financial damage, the Portuguese economy was also struck by a very 
low activity growth (0.5%). The global economic slowdown and the situation of turbulence in the 
international financial markets and the rising prices of raw materials had a huge impact in a weak 
economy like the Portuguese. 
The inflation rate followed the international trend, rising from 2.4% in 2007 to 2.7% in 
2008. In the labour market, which reacted with some lag to the other realities, it was happened a 
cutback in the unemployment rate, prowling to 8.1% in 2007 and dropping to 7.8% in 2008.  
However the fall in productivity was starting to feel. 
The Portuguese stock market was also severely affected. The principal index, PSI-20, 
depreciated 51% during the year, the worst performance of a set of 200 global indices followed by 
Euronext.   
In twelve months, the market capitalization from PSI 20 reduced significantly. The 20 firms 
quoted in this index, in late 2007, had a market capitalization from 94 300 millions of Euros and in 
late 2008 had lost 46 200 millions of Euros, to less than 48 100 millions of Euros. 
3.3.4 Belgium Evolution in 2008 
The financial and economic crisis lived in Europe and US had also consequences in Belgium. 
After a slow growth in the three quarters of the year 2008, the last quarter was marked by a 
negative growth11. 
The inflation rate decreased 0.3% from 2007 to 2008 (2.1% and 1.8%, respectively). 
Simultaneously the unemployment rate decreased 0.6% from the 8.1% in 2007 to 7.5% in 2008. The 
indicator GDP (real growth rate) decreases 2 points (3% in 2007 and 2.8% in 2008)12. 
                                                          
11
 Belgium – 2008 Article IV Consultations: Concluding Statement of the Mission (December, 2008). 
12
 The data is collected in CIA World Factbook. 
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Belgium dealt with a crisis in 2008 and 2009 – the so called 2008-2009 Belgian Financial 
Crisis. Two of the largest banks had financial problems, namely Fortis and Dexia. The problems were 
amplified by the international conjuncture and Belgium had to sell their share part of Fortis to the 
French bank BNP Paribas.  
Because of this crisis in the middle of 2008, BEL-20 stock market lost more than 20% of its 
value in the second week of October and, in 25th day of the same month, BEL-20 lost 60%. The 
performance of 10.000 Euros from BEL-20 was in the beginning of 2008 almost 10.000 Euros and 
dropped in the end of the year to less than 6.000 Euros. 
This particular conjuncture recommends, of course, strong caution in validation of the 
subsequent results and conclusions.  
3.3.5 Adoption of the Accounting Harmonization 
Before 2005, European countries used their own domestic accounting standards. In that 
year, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued the implementation of IFRS that 
resulted in the application of a set of financial reporting standards within Europe. 
This transition was enhanced by the Recommendation for Additional Guidance Regarding 
the Transition to IFRS by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), whose purpose 
was to create a comparable divulgation of the company’s information and to identify the goals of 
the transaction process. 
In Portugal, the market regulators, namely CMVM13 emitted a document concerning the 
obligation of a quarterly financial statement of disclosure, after the 2005 recommendation. 
Belgium is an example of the continental model of accounting and is vastly cited in the 
literature. The accounting is based in the Commercial Code and is characterized for their creditors’ 
protection, a financial reporting accordingly with the tax regulation, which gives a special attention 
to the balance sheet and uses the companies’ provisions to smooth earnings (Haverals, 2007).  
Before 2005, Belgium already allowed the use of the International Accounting Standards by 
their companies, even before the decision of the European Union. For that reason, the decision of 
mandatory disclosure in 2005 was not drastic for this country (Renders and Gaeremynck, 2007).  
                                                          
13
 The Portuguese Securities Market Commission, also known by its initials "CMVM", was established in April 
1991 with the task of supervising and regulating securities and other financial instruments markets 
(traditionally known as “stock markets”), as well as the activity of all those who operate within said markets. 
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4. Empirical results 
 Before applying the methodology, it was estimated a descriptive analysis for the most 
important variable – transparency - comparing the index based scores for the two countries. The 
data used in the descriptive statistics and in the econometric analysis focus on the firm-level. 
 The descriptive statistics are examined it the next four tables and describe the means, 
standard deviation, correlations and the t-test for the two transparency measures and the variables 
selected to explain the transparency. 
TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics for disclosure indices 
 
PORTUGAL BELGIUM 
 
CIFAR S_P CIFAR S_P 
 Mean 56.2 57.5 54.5 58 
 Median 57 59 56 58 
 Maximum 66 73 62 79 
 Minimum 39 28 41 40 
 Std. Dev. 5.7 9.5 5.5 8.2 
Q1 54 54 52 54 
Q3 59 65 58 61 
 
 
t-test for Equality of Means  
 
t Sig (2-tailed)  
CIFAR (Portugal and Belgium) 1.988* 0.053 
 
S&Ps (Portugal and Belgium) 0.534 0.596 
 
*10% statistical significance 
 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for the disclosure indices for the Portuguese and 
the Belgium subsamples. 
For Portugal, the mean of CIFAR index is 56.2, whereas for Belgium it presents a value of 
54.5. In what concerns the S&Ps index, the higher mean is for Belgium, with a score of 58, whereas 
the Portuguese mean score is of 57.5. 
The Standard Deviation gives an idea of the firm’s differences concerning transparency and, 
in both indices, the Portuguese firm have the most discrepant scores. 
In what concerns the CIFAR index, the most transparent firm re from Portugal (scored with 
66), but concerning S&Ps index the better score (79) comes from a Belgium company. This result 
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may be helped by the new accounting standards coming strongly to the EU and making further 
pressure to disclose more and with higher quality the accounting. 
A better score in CIFAR for Portugal and a better score in S&Ps for Belgium suggests that 
there are transparencies in different ranges. Consequently, it could conclude that Portuguese firms 
are more focuses on the spread of their accounting policies and Belgium firms are more concerned 
with the policies of ownership and governance. 
TABLE 5 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients between CIFAR and S&Ps based indices 
Countries n Correlation 
 
Both Portuguese and Belgium 
countries 
90 
 
0.4270*** 
 
Portugal 45 0.4888*** 
Belgium 45 0.3769*** 
*** 1% statistical significance 
 
Table 5 presents the correlation between the CIFAR and S&Ps indices for the Portuguese 
and Belgium markets. For both countries, the correlation between the two indices is of about 43%, 
significant at 1% level. Ding et al. (2008) found a correlation of 60%. The results of relatively high 
correlation (approximately 49%) between the transparency indices, and statically significant at 1% 
level for Portugal, is a good sign that transparency is explained by these factors. 
However, for the Belgium stock market, the result is lower (38% approximately), what could 
be a concern. Ding et al. (2008) found correlation of 72.7% and 60.6%, respectively for the Baltic 
and Nordic markets, which denote that, for these countries, the indices are more likely to 
measuring transparency. 
The descriptive statistic of the independent variables is showed in Table 6. 
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TABLE 6 
Descriptive Statistics for independent variables 
  
BELGIUM AND 
PORTUGAL MARKETS 
PORTUGAL MARKET BELGIUM MARKET 
Variable 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
SIZE 8.5482 0.7425 8.6081 0.7321 8.4883 0.7562 
LEVERAGE 0.6049 0.6735 0.7419 0.8995 0.4680 0.2647 
PROFITABILITY -27.5797 278.3622 1.1852 8.6101 -56.3446 393.6566 
AUDITOR 0.7556 0.4322 0.7333 0.4472 0.7778 0.4204 
EQUITY_OFFER 0.0111 0.1054 0 0 0.0222 0.1491 
OWNERSHIP 0.6216 0.2125 0.6401 0.2035 0.6030 0.2219 
 
The size of the Portuguese and Belgium firms are quite similar, being the size mean of 
respectively 8.61 and 8.49. The leverage is higher for the Portuguese firms (0.74) than for Belgian 
firms (0.47). 
Concerning the profitability, both markets, considered together, present a negative 
profitability, with a significant number of companies presenting a negative value for the earnings 
before extraordinary items. Indeed, 2008 was a year characterized by a financial and economy 
crisis. 
The Belgian market has 77.78% of the sample companies audited by one of the BIG 4, while 
the Portuguese market has 73.33% of the companies with the BIG 4 audit. 
Furthermore, equity offer was an absent and rare event, respective by the Portuguese and 
the Belgium sample (2%). 
Finally, both Portuguese and Belgian firms present a high level of ownership concentration 
with a Belgian mean of 60.3% and a Portuguese mean of 64%. 
Comparing these results with the ones of Ding et al. (2008), it is observed that, globally, 
both the Baltic and the Nordic firms’ present higher size, have lower leverage, higher profitability, 
higher percentage of auditors from BIG 4, and similar number of equity offers. The exception is the 
fact that Nordic firms have a lower level of ownership concentration, around 47.68% 
Table 7 provides the correlation coefficients between the transparency indices, the 
Portuguese coefficient which is a dummy variable that take, the value one if the Portugal and zero 
otherwise as well as among the control variables. All the variables include the two samples and are 
computed as discussed earlier. 
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TABLE 7 
Correlation Coefficients of variables for both countries together 
*** at 1% statistical significance 
** at 5% statistical significance 
* at 10% statistical significance 
 
Both the CIFAR and S&Ps indices present a non significant correlation with PT. 
Disclosure correlates positively and significantly with the size of firm and the auditor 
quality. In what concerns the correlation coefficients among the control variables, the results show 
a positive and significant correlation between SIZE and both AUDITOR and EQUITY_OFFER, as well 
as a positive correlation between PROFITABILITY and OWNERSHIP, at 5% level. However, these 
coefficients are not very high (always below 50%), so it does not appear to be sufficiently large to 
cause concern about multicollinearity problems. All the other coefficients present not statistically 
significant. 
 Next, it is presented the results of the regression models presented in the methodology 
session. 
4.1 Transparency  
Table 8 reports the results of the ordinary least square (OLS) regression models, analyzing 
the relation between disclosure levels (measured by the CIFAR and S&Ps indices) and the firm – 
specific variable, in order to study the information transparency. The inclusion of variables 
explaining transparency was performed regarding previous literature, specially the study of Ding et 
al. (2008). The dependent variables are: PORTUGAL, SIZE, LEVERAGE, PROFITABILITY, AUDITOR, 
EQUITY OFFER and OWNERSHIP. The Table exhibits two models: one includes the variable 
OWNERSHIP and the other does not. The t-statistics are based on White Test (1980).  
 
 
 
 
  CIFAR S_P PT SIZE LEVERAGE PROFITABILTY AUDITOR EQUITY_OFFER 
PT 0.1329 -0.0195 
      SIZE ***0.3166 ***0.3811 -0.0213 
     LEVERAGE 0.0579 -0.0610 0.1619 0.1308 
    PROFITABILITY 0.0757 0.0788 0.0971 -0.1413 -0.0209 
   AUDITOR **0.2327 ***0.2921 -0.0380 ***0.4183 -0.1376 -0.0543 
  EQUITY_OFFER 0.1255 -0.0215 -0.0992 *0.1928 0.0162 0.0127 0.0603 
 OWNERSHIP -0.0773 -0.0219 0.1287 -0.1079 0.0174 **0.2401 -0.0846 0.1643 
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TABLE 8 
Regression Results- Determinants of disclosure levels 
 
Considering the Model 1 for the CIFAR index, all the coefficients have a positive sign, which 
is the expected sign, except for OWNERSHIP. However, only coefficients on the SIZE, PROFITABILITY 
and EQUITY OFFER are statistically significant. In model 2, with the inclusion of the variable 
OWNERSHIP, the variable that explain the disclosure in a significant way stay the same: SIZE, 
PROFITABILITY and EQUITY OFFER. These results are consistent with previous studies, such a 
Singhvi and Desai (1971), Branco (2006), Lopes and Rodrigues (2006); Ding et al. (2008) and Cho et 
al. (2010).  
The results suggest that firms that present higher level of transparency, tend to be ones of 
larger size, higher profitability and with equity offers events. 
Having more profitability will increase the transparency in 0.002 and 0.004, in mean and 
approximately, in the score CIFAR and S&Ps, respectively, which is a small change in the level of 
transparency, but in the analyze proves to be significant. 
Regarding the SIZE of the firm, it could be seen that bigger firms will have better scores of 
transparency. Size will generate an augment in the score of CIFAR of 1.99, approximately, for the 
first model and 1.91, approximately, for the second model. 
The EQUITY OFFERS are also statistically significant explaining the transparency. Pertaining 
to the measure CIFAR, there is a positive relation translated in an augment of 4.25 points, in mean 
and approximately, in the score.  
 
CIFAR S&Ps 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables   Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig.  Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. 
Intercept 
 
36.2301 0.0000 38.6337 0.0000  18.6738 0,0942 17.9955 0.1082 
Portugal 
 
1.5516 0.1744 1.6990 0.1447  -0.2927 0,8639 -0.3343 0.1082 
Size 
 
1.9874 0.0180 1.9081 0.0229  4.4460 0,0013 4.4684 0.0014 
Leverage 
 
0.1729 0.8228 0.1784 0.8181  -1.0966 0,5755 -1.0982 0.5765 
Profitability 0.0021 0.0000 0.0026 0.0000  0.0044 0,0000 0.0043 0.0000 
Auditor 
 
1.7328 0.1967 1.6792 0.2203  2.8028 0,2475 2.8179 0.2457 
Equity Offer 4.5379 0.0006 5.3569 0.0013  -8.7018 0,0000 -9.0155 0.0003 
Ownership 
  
-2.8278 0.2204    0.7979 0.8416 
Adj. R
2
   0.1510 0.0894  0.1437 0.1336 
N   90 90  90 90 
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It is apparent from the value of the adjusted R2, reported in Table 8 (15% and 8.9%), that a 
substantial variation in the transparency level of CIFAR is unexplained by both models. 
Using the S&Ps score for transparency the regression fit slightly weaker than for the CIFAR 
index in the Model 1 (0.14 against 0.15), but stronger in Model 2 (0.13 against 0.09). Once more, 
the variables that can explain the transparency are SIZE, PROFITABILITY and EQUITY OFFER, with all 
the other coefficients presenting a no significant value.  
However, contradicting the conclusions of CIFAR, the sign of the EQUITY OFFER is negatively 
related with transparency in the S&Ps measure. The same results were obtained by Ding et al. 
(2008).  
The Portuguese dummy is positive for CIFAR index and negative for S&Ps index, suggesting 
that, considering the control variables, Portuguese firms are more transparent then the Belgian 
ones in the accounting policies and less transparent in what concerns their ownership and the 
governance features. However, the coefficients are not significant. 
The adjusted R2 for CIFAR models is very similar to the ones of Ding et al. (2008), which is 
relatively small. For the S&Ps models, the adjusted R2 is high in the Ding et al. (2008) study; 
approximately 70% of the variable transparency is measured by the global model. However, in the 
study model, this measure is much smaller (14.37% and 13.36%, Model 1 and 2, respectively). For 
both cases the regressions are not strong enough to explain the transparency. 
Ding et al. (2008) found evidence that Baltic firms are less transparent then the Nordic 
ones, concerning the subjects of ownership and governance (S&Ps index). Although their models 
results are not quite different from the results here presented, the main differences are that the 
equity offers does not explain the transparency, contrary to the dissertation results, and, for the 
CIFAR index, they found evidence that auditor and leverage influences positively and significantly 
the transparency for both models, and for the Model 2, respectively. 
Having presented the results related with transparency, now the results associated with 
volatility are exposed. 
4.2 Volatility 
To deeply understand the transparency, it is necessary to investigate the consequences of 
that transparency in the economy. According Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), when the disclosure 
increases in the company, the cost of capital reduction in the firm is one of the consequences. The 
immediate consequence in the change on stock market is the sudden variation of the prices, 
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specifically the change on stock price volatility. This last consideration supports the option, in this 
work, of stock price volatility to investigate the consequences of transparency on the economy. 
The model regression [4] is run in order to analyze the relationship between stock price 
volatility on the disclosure (TRANSPARENCY) and a set of control variables (SIZE, LEVERAGE, 
PROFITABILITY, MARKET-TO-BOOK and DIVIDEND YIELD), considering the Portuguese and Belgian 
samples separately, in order to compare the two Euronext markets. The results are illustrated on 
Table 9. Panel A presents the results for the Portuguese sample and Panel B for the Belgian sample. 
 
TABLE 9 
Regression results – Effect of disclosure on stock price volatility 
Panel A: Stock price volatility regressed on disclosure metric and control variable for the Portuguese sample 
 CIFAR- based disclosure variable S&Ps- based disclosure variable 
Variables Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. 
Transparency -0.0040 0.8906 0.0009 0.9687 
Size 1.0716 0.0003 1.0568 0.0010 
Leverage 0.1049 0.5550 0.1132 0.5566 
Profitability 0.0587 0.5437 0.0125 0.4837 
Market-to-Book 0.0587 0.2965 0.0571 0.3024 
Dividend Yield -8.9523 0.2333 -9.0057 0.2310 
Intercept -7.6632 0.0044 -7.8163 0.0016 
Adj. R
2
 0.2726 0.2721 
N 45 45 
Panel B: Stock price volatility regressed on disclosure metric and control variable for the Belgium 
 CIFAR- based disclosure variable S&Ps- based disclosure variable 
Variables Coef. Sig. Coef. Sig. 
Transparency -0.6641 0.1815 -0.4755 0.1691 
Size 1.8587 0.6727 3.4848 0.4559 
Leverage 11.7928 0.3275 5.3431 0.6463 
Profitability 0.0267 0.4152 0.0250 0.4406 
Market-to-Book 0.0319 0.4792 0.0289 0.5175 
Dividend Yield 53.4223 0.1161 64.7040 0.5557 
Intercept 13.6295 0.7600 -9.1703 0.8142 
Adj. R
2
 0.7858 0.7865 
N 45 45 
Industry Fixed effects included in the models 
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Two models are computed, one using the transparency index CIFAR and the other using the 
Standard & Poor’s index. The models consider the industry fixed effects that control the volatility 
changes due to the type of industry. 
The p-value associated with each regression coefficient represents the one-tailed 
probability level for the differences in the volatility and the several independent variables. For the 
Portuguese sample (Panel A), the only variable that contributes to explain the stock price volatility 
is the SIZE, in a positive way. An increase of one unity in the size of the company causes an increase 
of 1.07 and 1.06 (CIFAR and S&Ps respectively) in the stock price volatility. For the SIZE variable, the 
results are consistent with the ones of Fama and French (1992), Allen and Rachim (1996), Baumann 
and Nier (2004) and Ding et al. (2008), for the Nordic sample. Beyond the size influence, Ding et al. 
(2008) find some evidence that profitability affects positively the stock price volatility. 
All the other variables, TRANSPARENCY, LEVERAGE, PROFITABILITY, MARKET-TO-BOOK and 
DIVIDEND YIELD are not statistically significant.  
Having in mind the main objective of this study, the CIFAR and S&Ps indices are not good 
measures to explain the changes in the stock price. The non significant coefficient leads to the 
conclusion that in Portugal the stock prices volatility is not influenced by the transparency of the 
company, i.e., the level of disclosure, in the annual reports, observed by the investors. 
Consequently, it does not influence the investors’ decision of buying or selling. It can be said that 
there is one type of Portuguese dominant investor: a passive investor who, in the presence of 
information from the annual reports, do not change his decision of buy or sell shares, leading to an 
exiguous influence on the volatility of prices. 
For the Belgium sample (Panel B), it is possible to see that this model has a greater 
explanatory power than for the Portuguese samples, with adjusted R2 of about 0.79, against 0.27, in 
the previous country. 
However, none of the coefficient presents a statistically significant value, thus, individually, 
none of these variables can explain the stock price volatility. 
The high value of the adjusted R2 for the Belgium sample, which shows that about 78% of 
the model, explains the volatility, led to the investigation of the econometric problem – 
multicollinearity. However, analyzing the correlations matrix, there is no proving that 
multicollinearity is present in the model. The high value could be explained by the introduction of 
the industry fixed effects, which could be in fact related with the volatility. 
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Overall, the results do not give support for the hypothesis that transparency scores are 
negative associated with the stock prices volatility, contrary to the results of Ding et al. (2008), for 
the S&Ps index.  
As the only measure disclosure in annual reports, it does not necessarily capture all aspects 
of firms’ disclosure practices, which motivate to do robustness tests, in order to obvious this 
limitation.  
4. 3 Robustness Tests  
For robustness reasons, the effect of quarterly reports on stock price volatility will now be 
presented. After analyzing the results of Table 9, it was set a new possibility for understanding 
transparency. The variable used to measure transparency stood quite unfitted to stock price 
volatility. So far, it is used annual reports to determine the transparency. However, concerning the 
study of the sensitivity of the stock price, it is more suitable to increase the frequency of disclosure, 
such as the reliable information of quarterly reports. Several authors use the quarterly reports as a 
proxy of disclosure, such as Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Healy et al. (1999), Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) and Alves and Santos (2005). 
 Consequently, it is considered a model of volatility similar to the model [4], formulated as 
follows: 
                                                                 
                                                                                [5] 
where: 
Volatility = Standard deviation of share prices calculated from end-of-week share 
prices; 
TranspT1 = CIFAR-based index with the use of first Quarterly Report; 
TranspS1 = CIFAR-based index with the use of first Half-Year Report; 
TranspT3 = CIFAR-based index with the use of third Quarterly Report; 
TranspA = CIFAR-based index with the use of Annual Report. 
 
The analysis is conducted for Portugal, the central concern of this work, and the 
transparency index used is CIFAR. The use of CIFAR is justified because of the good descriptive 
results of the Portuguese sample with this index, better than the one supplied by S&Ps. The 
regression model follows the econometric procedures of the volatility model [4].  
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The information of the Quarterly Reports was downloaded in the CMVM website or, 
alternatively, in the companies’ website when it was not available in the first site. The number of 
firms is now reduced from 45 to 42, because of the Quarterly reports presented. The company 
“EDP Renováveis” is listed only in 2008 and the First Quarterly Report does not exist. The company 
“F. Ramada” released only the Third Quarter Report and the “Portugal Telecom” the First Quarterly 
Report. For these reasons, the information was processed with some missing values.  
Table 10 shows the regression [5] results of the effects of quarterly disclosure on stock 
price volatility. 
TABLE 10 
Regression results – Effect of Quarterly Reports disclosure on stock price volatility 
CIFAR- based disclosure variable 
Variables Coef. Sig. 
TranspT1 -0.1731 0.2397 
TranspS1 -0.0344 0.0486 
TranspT3 0.2005 0.1770 
TranspA -0.0110 0.6931 
Size 1.2795 0.0001 
Leverage 0.1466 0.4381 
Profitability 0.0091 0.6105 
Market-to-Book 0.1524 0.0243 
Dividend Yield -17.4694 0.0410 
Intercept -8.3583 0.0510 
Adj. R
2
 0.3885 
N 42 
 
Comparing these results with the ones of Table 9, these models present greater 
explanatory power than the previous one (the adjusted R2 is about 0.39, against 0.37 on Table 9). 
In the transparency measures only the half-year report (TRANSPS1) is statistical significant 
at 5 percent level.  Three of the four measures arose statistically non significant. Analysing only the 
sign, it is possible to witness the opposite relation between the variables explored, only inexistent 
in the Third Quarter information.  
The results are not consistent with the ones of Alves and Santos (2005) for the Portuguese 
market. They found a significant relation between first and third quarterly reports and the stock 
price volatility. This asymmetry of results could be explained by the methodology chosen. Their 
47 
 
announcements were done on press releases and through immediate announcements of legally 
required financial statements.  
In what concerns the control variables, the results show that stock price volatility can be 
positively explained by SIZE and MB, and negatively by the DIVIDEND YIELD. On Table 9, only the 
SIZE coefficient was statistically significant. This means that these variables influence the stock price 
and their changes.  
Analysing the information collected, the variation of the CIFAR score is higher for the 
quarterly reports than for the annual reports. 
Globally, the main conclusions are unchanged. The transparency for the Portuguese 
companies does not influence much the investors in the moment of buying or selling shares. The 
lack of reaction in presence of transparency could indicate that the information is not important to 
the market, with some passiveness in the presence of new information, the investors do not 
understand the information conveyed to the market or maybe the information was already known 
before the release of the report. 
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5. Conclusion 
This study provides empirical evidence on the determinants of information disclosure and 
the effects of disclosure on stock price volatility for Portuguese and Belgian stock markets, using a 
sample of the non-financial listed firms in these two stock markets. 
The main contribution of this study was to find some determinants of the firm’s disclosure 
policy of Portuguese and Belgian companies. Using several items from their annual reports, the 
non-financial listed companies on the EL and EB, were evaluated according two based indices (the 
CIFAR and the S&Ps indices), judging if the firm was transparent or if some of the information was 
maintained private. The countries considered in the work were chosen namely because of their 
presence in Euronext N.V. thus, it was possible for their accountings to be similar. Moreover, the 
adoption of the IFRS in Europe during the year 2005 created an accounting harmonization. Because 
the two countries are limited by the size of their capital markets, it helps to create a size and 
industry matched sample. 
The transparency was measured by two indices, based on the disclosure on the annual 
reports. The methodological procedures to analyse the transparency were chosen taking into 
account the characteristics of the two indices measure. The number of items used in the index and 
the deepness of the information is an option that is necessary to be scrutinized. A disclosure index, 
with fewer items14 gives more important and more general information, but could be in part 
incomplete. An index with more items and consequently more complete, could distort the 
importance of some items that, in fact, are not so important. In other words, the reduced 
importance in some disclosure will be levelled with the high value of some disclosure. The authors 
that use an index measure, such as Raffournier (1995), reach to general conclusions that are not 
quite different from this study. 
According the descriptive statistics, the results suggest that while Portuguese firms follow 
the disclosure concerning their accounting policies, the Belgium firms pursue better policies of 
ownership and governance. Indeed, forward tests strengthen this conclusion, suggesting that the 
two countries give different importance of the disclosure type. Portugal has better score in CIFAR 
based index and Belgium has a greater score on S&Ps based index. The result leads to the 
conclusion that Portuguese firms are more concern about disclosure from the regulation of 
                                                          
14
 Raffournier (1995) used a measure with only 30 items that covers more general information for a sample of 
Swiss companies. Instead several items around the same type of disclosure it is used a more synthetic item. 
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accounting and Belgian firms are more transparent in terms of ownership structure. However, as 
the result is not statistical significant, the findings have to be taken with caution. 
Part of the disclosure has been found significantly related to size, profitability and equity 
offer, giving some support to hypothesis one. This result is in agreement with the one of Lang and 
Lundholm (1997), Healy et al. (1999), Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Ding et al. (2008), among 
others. 
This study investigated also the consequences of transparency in the market. Previous 
literature has found significantly relations between the changes on the stock prices and 
transparency. Tests were conducted to analyze what could change the stock prices volatility, with 
transparency as an independent variable and with a set of control variables: such as size, leverage, 
profitability, market-to-book, dividend yield and control variables for industry fixed effects. 
In the two countries, it was found no statistical significance between the transparency 
measures CIFAR and Standard and Poor’s based indices, present in the Annual Reports of the firms, 
and the volatility present in the stock price. Consequently, it was not found evidence supporting 
hypothesis 2. Nevertheless, results suggest that firms with more information disclose on key items 
of disclosure show lower measures of stock volatility than firms that disclose less information, with 
the only exception of S&Ps in Portugal. However, these conclusions must be interpreted with care, 
since the results presented are conditioned by the effectiveness of the model. For the Portuguese 
sample, only the size of the companies seems to be significantly related with the volatility, which 
suggests that the stock price volatility will increase with the size of the companies. 
The periodicity on disclosure is an important feature in the analysis. This study was 
conducted based on the annual reports. However, the quarterly information gives more detailed 
information across the year, what could improve the empirical results related with stock price 
volatility, the dependent variable considered in order to measure the economic consequences. 
Indeed, some authors used quarterly announcements or other reports published by the 
companies15. Consequently, for robustness reasons, it was chosen to consider the quarterly 
announcements, for Portuguese firms, to understand the relationship between disclosure and stock 
price volatility. However, the obtained results using quarterly information results were similar to 
the previous one: no statistical significance in the first, third and last quarterly reports. The half 
                                                          
15
 La Porta et al. (1997) use quarterly earnings announcements for the US stock market exchange and Botosan 
and Plumlee (2001) use not only the annual reports but also the quarterly and the other published reports 
and investors relations from 4705 firm-observations integrated in the AIMR Reports. 
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year report is the only coefficient of transparency measure which had statistical significance in 
stock price volatility, suggesting that this release of information is quite important for the investors. 
Globally, it is important to interpret the results carefully, because this study was conducted 
for the year 2008, a period characterized by a deep financial crisis in the two countries, and in a 
global scale as well, which can distort the results. Volatility is an expressive example of this possible 
distortion, measured by the end of the week stock prices, because it suffered a big depreciation 
since the beginning of January until the final of December. In addition, the number of equity offers 
(zero for the Portuguese market and one for the Belgian market) could be the consequence of this 
financial bad year. However, Ding et al. (2008) conducted a similar study for the Baltic region, in a 
period of market growth (the year of 2004) and find similar results, which give some reliability for 
this study in what concerns the main conclusions. 
Several findings expressed before may be limited to the accounting standards that have 
place in Europe. The reports divulged by the companies could be considered as an obligation and 
not so much a managerial decision. The mandatory disclosure could be the reflex of unwillingness 
of voluntary disclosure information. This limitation is also recognized by previous financial 
literature, such as Raffournier (1995), who states that this subject was more accurate for old annual 
reports, where there is no mandatory disclosure. From the accounting standards used after 2005, 
the transparency scores could be inflated in order to fulfil the mandatory disclosure, which is a 
concern. Consequently, a more scrutinized index to measure the transparency may be better to 
embrace particular points not included in standard procedures and could make the difference. 
Finally, some issues still not analysed in this dissertation could be suggested, maybe leading 
to future researches, whose contributions may prove beneficial to the development of research 
related to disclosure and transparency. A possible path of future research might be the split of 
disclosure between mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure and analyse it separately. Other 
feature might be the analysis of the disclosure in the same period, but more fragmented, for 
instance, considering the quarterly reports for the two markets. That will better capture the 
markets response, namely the price variance. Finally, the last suggestion could be extended to the 
other index used - Standard & Poor’s index - which, as seen before, will better accommodate the 
disclosures of Belgium.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: The measure of transparency 
 
To provide a self-computed measure of the level of disclosure it was used the CIFAR and 
Standard & Poors based index.  
The attribution of disclosure was binary. The evaluation is done by the following principles: 
 If the company provides the information of that item or if the information is not relevant 
for the company is used “1” to qualify it.  
 If the company does not provide the information or if the firm does not present 
information explaining that the item is inappropriate for the firm to report is used “0”.  
 If no information is provided, but the disclosure is irrelevant and there is no need to inform 
that it is inappropriate it is used “Excluded”. 
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Appendix 2: List of Discretionary Items considered in CIFAR-based Index 
A: General information 
1-Address/Telephone/Fax/Telex 
2-Product Segment 
3-Geographic Segment 
4-Management Information 
5-Subsidiaries Information 
6-Future plans/Chairman or CEO’s Statement 
7-Number of Employees 
8-Fiscal Year-End 
B: Income Statement 
9-Consolidated Income Statement 
10-Cost of Goods Sold 
11-Complete Income Statement 
12-Sales 
13-Selling, General and Administrative Expenses 
14-Operating Income 
15-Foreign Exchange Gains/Losses 
16-Extraordinary Gains/Losses 
17-Income Tax Expense 
18-Minority Interest 
19-Net Income Reported 
C: Balance Sheet 
20-Complete Balance Sheet 
21-Current Assets Separated from Fixed Assets 
22-Current Liability Separated from LT Liability 
23-Owners’ Equity Separated from Liability 
24-Cash and Cash Equivalents 
25-Accounts Receivable 
26-Inventories 
27-Current Assets 
28-Fixed Assets on Asset Side 
29-Goodwill and Other Intangibles 
30-Shareholders’ Equity Changes 
31-Appropriation of Retained Earnings 
D: Funds flow / Cash flow 
32-Cash Flow Statement 
33-Complete Cash/Fund Flow Statement 
E: Accounting Policies 
34-Accounting Standards 
35-Financial Statements Cost Basis 
36-50% Long-Term Investments 
37-Starting Point for Funds Statement 
38-Research & Development Costs 
39-Pension Costs 
40-Reasons for Extraordinary Items 
41-Inventory Costing Method 
42-20% Long-Term Investments  
 
(continue) 
 
 63 
 
Appendix 2 (continued) 
 
43-21-50% Long-Term Investments 
44-Acquisition Method 
45-Accounting for Goodwill 
46-Deferred Taxes 
47-Outside Manager of Pension Funds 
48-Long-Term Financial Leases 
49-Foreign Currency Translation Method 
50-Foreign Currency Translation Gains / Losses 
51-Discretionary Reserves 
52-Minority Interest 
53-Contingent Liabilities 
F: Stockholders’ Information 
54-Dividend per Share 
55-Earnings per Share 
56-Number of Shares Outstanding 
57-Multiple Shares 
58-Par Value 
59-Total Dividends 
60-Stock Split / Dividend / Rights Issues 
61-Stock Price 
62-Stock Exchange Listing 
63-Volume Traded 
64-Diluted Earnings Per Share 
65-Changes in Capital 
66-Different Div. for Multiple Classes of Shares 
67-EPS for Multiple Classes of Shares 
68-Significant Shareholders 
69-Composition of Shareholdings 
G: Supplementary Information 
70-Earnings per Share Numerator 
71-Earnings per Share Denominator 
72-Notes to Accounts 
73-Disclosure of Subsequent Events 
74-Remuneration of Directors and Officers 
75-Research & Development Costs 
76-Capital Expenditure 
77-List of Board Members and Their Affiliations 
78-Exports; Financial Summary 
 
Removed from the scoring 
Funds Flow Statement 
Funds from Operations 
Funds Definition (Replaced by Cash Flow Statement) 
Quarterly/Interim Dividends (Dividends payed once a year) 
Separation of Non-Equity Reserves and Retained Earnings 
Total Assets Can Be Derived (Items outdated) 
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Appendix 3: List of Discretionary Items considered in S&Ps-based Index 
Ownership Structure and Investor Relations (S&Ps Ownership) 
Does the company in its annual accounts disclose? 
1. The number of issued and outstanding ordinary shares disclosed? 
2. The number of issued and outstanding other shares disclosed (preferred, non-voting)? 
3. The par value of each ordinary share disclosed? 
4. The par value of each other shares disclosed (preferred, non-voting)? 
5 number of authorized but unissued & outstanding ordinary shares disclosed? 
6 number of authorized but unissued & outstanding other shares disclosed? 
7 par value of authorized but unissued & outstanding ordinary Shares disclosed? 
8 par value of authorized but unissued & outstanding other shares disclosed? 
9 top 1 shareholder? 
10 top 3 shareholders? 
11 top 5 shareholders? 
12 top 10 shareholders? 
13 description of share classes provided? 
14 review of shareholders by type? 
15 number and identity of shareholders holding more than 3%? 
16 number and identity of shareholders holding more than 5%? 
17 number and identity of shareholders holding more than 10%? 
18 percentage of cross-ownership? 
19 existence of a Corporate Governance Charter or Code of Best Practice? 
20 Corporate Governance Charter / Code of Best Practice itself? 
21 details about its Articles of Association. (e.g. changes)? 
22 voting rights for each voting or non-voting share? 
23 way that shareholders nominate directors to board? 
24 way shareholders convene an EGM? 
25 procedure for putting inquiry rights to the board? 
26 procedure for putting proposals at shareholders meetings? 
27 review of last shareholders meeting? (e.g. minutes) 
28 calendar of important shareholders dates? 
 
Financial Transparency & Information Disclosure (S&Ps Finance)- 
Does the company in its annual accounts disclose: 
1 its accounting policy? 
2 the accounting standards it uses for its accounts? 
3 accounts according to the local accounting standards? 
4 accounts according to an internationally recognized accounting standard (IAS/US GAAP)? 
5 its balance sheet according to international accounting standard (IAS/US GAAP)? 
6 its income statement according to international accounting standard (IAS/US GAAP)? 
7 a basic earnings forecast of any kind? 
8 a detailed earnings forecast? 
9 financial information on a quarterly basis? 
10 a segment analysis (broken down by business line)? 
11 the name of its auditing firm? 
12 a reproduction of the auditors’ report? 
13 how much it pays in audit fees to the auditor? 
14 any non-audit fees paid to auditor? 
15 consolidated financial statements (or only the parent/holding co)? 
16 methods of asset valuation? 
17 information on method of fixed assets depreciation? 
18 a list of affiliates in which it holds a minority stake?     
(continue) 
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Appendix 3 (continued) 
19 a reconciliation of its domestic accounting standards to IAS/US GAAP? 
20 the ownership structure of affiliates? 
21 details of the kind of business it is in? 
22 details of the products or services produced/provided? 
23 output in physical terms? (number of users etc.) 
24 characteristics of assets employed? 
25 efficiency indicators (ROA ROE etc.) 
26 a discussion of corporate strategy? 
27 any plans for investment in the coming year(s)? 
28 detailed information about investment plans in the coming year(s)? 
29 an output forecast of any kind? 
30 an overview of trends in its industry? 
31 its market share for any or all of its businesses? 
32 a list/register of related party transactions? 
33 a list/register of group transactions? 
 
Board and Management Structure and Process (S&Ps Governance) – 
Does the company in its annual accounts disclose: 
1 a list of board members (names)? 
2 details about directors (other than name/title)? 
3 details about current employment/position of directors provided? 
4 details about previous employment/positions provided? 
5 when each of the directors joined the board? 
6 classification of directors as an executive or an outside director? 
7 a named chairman listed? 
8 detail about the chairman (other than name/title)? 
9 details about role of the board of directors at the company? 
10 a list of matters reserved for the board? 
11 a list of board committees? 
12 the existence of an audit committee? 
13 the names on the audit committee? 
14 the existence of a remuneration/compensation committee? 
15 the names on the remuneration/compensation committee)? 
16 existence of a nomination committee? 
17 the names on the nomination committee? 
18 the existence of other internal audit functions besides the Audit Committee? 
19 the existence of a strategy/investment/finance committee? 
20 the number of shares in the company held by directors? 
21 a review of the last board meeting? (e.g. minutes) 
22 whether they provide director training? 
23 the decision-making process of directors’ pay? 
24 the specifics of directors’ pay (e.g. the salary levels etc.)? 
25 the form of directors’ salaries (e.g. cash, shares, etc.)? 
26 the specifics on performance-related pay for directors? 
27 the decision-making of managers’ (not Board) pay? 
28 the specifics of managers’ (not on Board) pay (e.g. salary levels etc.)? 
29 the form of managers’ (not on Board) pay? 
30 the specifics on performance-related pay for managers? 
31 the list of the senior managers (not on the Board of Directors)? 
32 the backgrounds of senior managers disclosed? 
33 the details of the CEO’s contract disclosed? 
34 the number of shares held by the senior managers disclosed? 
35 the number of shares held in other affiliated companies by managers? 
 66 
 
Appendix 4: Portuguese sample Companies and their Industry Sector (ICB) 
Companies ICB 
ALTRI SGPS 2000 Industrials 
BENFICA 5000 Consumer Services 
BRISA 2000 Industrials 
CIMPOR,SGPS 2000 Industrials 
COFINA,SGPS 5000 Consumer Services 
COMPTA 9000 Technology 
CORTICEIRA AMORIM 3000 ConsumerGoods 
EDP 7000 Utilities 
EDP RENOVAVEIS 7000 Utilities 
ESTORIL SOL N 5000 Consumer Services 
EUROPAC 1000 BasicMaterials 
F.RAMA 1000 BasicMaterials 
FISIPE 1000 BasicMaterials 
FUT.CLUBE PORTO 5000 Consumer Services 
GALP ENERGIA-NOM 0001 Oil&Gas 
GLINTT 9000 Technology 
IBERSOL,SGPS 5000 Consumer Services 
IMOB.C GRAO PARA 2000 Industrials 
IMPRESA,SGPS 5000 Consumer Services 
INAPA-INV.P.GESTAO 1000 BasicMaterials 
J.MARTINS,SGPS 5000 Consumer Services 
LISGRAFICA 2000 Industrials 
MARTIFER 2000 Industrials 
MEDIA CAPITAL 5000 Consumer Services 
MOTA ENGIL 2000 Industrials 
NOVABASE,SGPS 9000 Technology 
OREY ANTUNES ESC. 2000 Industrials 
P.TELECOM 6000 Telecommunications 
PAP.FERNANDES 1000 BasicMaterials 
PORTUCEL 1000 BasicMaterials 
REDITUS,SGPS 9000 Technology 
REN 7000 Utilities 
S.COSTA 2000 Industrials 
SACYR VALLEHERMOSO 2000 Industrials 
SAG GEST 5000 Consumer Services 
SEMAPA 2000 Industrials 
SONAE 5000 Consumer Services 
SONAE IND.SGPS 2000 Industrials 
SONAECOM,SGPS 6000 Telecommunications 
SPORTING 5000 Consumer Services 
SUMOL COMPAL 3000 ConsumerGoods 
TEIXEIRA DUARTE 2000 Industrials 
TOYOTA CAETANO 2000 Industrials 
VAA VISTA ALEGRE 3000 ConsumerGoods 
ZON MULTIMEDIA 5000 Consumer Services 
Source: EL website 
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Appendix 5: Belgian sample Companies and their Industry Sector (ICB) 
Companies ICB 
AGFA-GEVAERT 2000 Industrials 
ALFACAM GROUP 5000 Consumer Services 
BARCO 2000 Industrials 
BEKAERT 2000 Industrials 
BELGACOM 6000 Telecommunications 
CAMPINE 1000 BasicMaterials 
CFE (D) 2000 Industrials 
COLRUYT 5000 Consumer Services 
D'IETEREN 5000 Consumer Services 
DECEUNINCK 2000 Industrials 
DEFICOM GROUP 5000 Consumer Services 
DELHAIZE GROUP 5000 Consumer Services 
ELIA 7000 Utilities 
EVS BROADC.EQUIPM. 2000 Industrials 
EXMAR 2000 Industrials 
FLUXYS CAT.D 0001 Oil&Gas 
HAMON 2000 Industrials 
I.R.I.S  GROUP 9000 Technology 
JENSEN-GROUP 2000 Industrials 
KEYWARE TECH. (D) 9000 Technology 
KINEPOLIS GROUP 5000 Consumer Services 
LOTUS BAKERIES 3000 ConsumerGoods 
MOBISTAR 6000 Telecommunications 
MOURY CONSTRUCT 2000 Industrials 
PARC PARADISIO 5000 Consumer Services 
PCB 5000 Consumer Services 
PICANOL 2000 Industrials 
PUNCH INT. 2000 Industrials 
RECTICEL 1000 BasicMaterials 
RESILUX 2000 Industrials 
ROSIER 1000 BasicMaterials 
ROULARTA 5000 Consumer Services 
SABCA (D) 2000 Industrials 
SIOEN 3000 ConsumerGoods 
SOLVAC NOM(RETAIL) 1000 BasicMaterials 
SYSTEMAT 9000 Technology 
TELENET GROUP 5000 Consumer Services 
TESSENDERLO 1000 BasicMaterials 
THENERGO (D) 7000 Utilities 
VAN DE VELDE 3000 ConsumerGoods 
ZETES INDUSTRIES 9000 Technology 
Source: EB website 
 
